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I.  INTRODUCTION 
We begin with some familiar facts: In 2008, then-presidential 
candidate Barack Obama argued that the U.S. healthcare system 
needed a major overhaul.1  Once elected, President Obama put 
forward numerous proposals to address the health care challenges 
he identified.  Members of the House of Representatives and the 
Senate retreated to their respective corners, some in support of the 
President’s plan, others in opposition.  Citizens and numerous 
interest groups took sides as well, informing congressional leaders 
of their support for or opposition to the proposed law.  The 
legislators succeeded in passing a bill containing some aspects of 
the President’s proposal in addition to a wide range of 
amendments.  With the President’s signature, the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (known to many as 
“Obamacare”) became law.2   
While the President held a large signing ceremony flanked by 
allies in Congress and those in his administration, not everyone 
was celebrating.  Groups of opponents to the legislation brought 
claims challenging the Act’s legal validity.  One case, brought by 
two individual plaintiffs, a business trade organization, and 
numerous states, ultimately made its way to the U.S. Supreme 
Court and resulted in the U.S. Supreme Court decision National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.3  Several issues 
before the Court revolved around the Affordable Care Act’s 
constitutionality.  The Court considered whether Congress 
overstepped the constitutional bounds of its Commerce Clause 
power4 as well as its enumerated power to tax.5  Additionally, the 
Court considered whether tying Medicaid funds to an expansion of 
the program amounted to unconstitutional coercion of state 
governments.6   
                                                                                                                   
 1 Paul Kurgman, Op-Ed., Clinton, Obama, Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2008, at A23 
(describing then-candidate Obama’s plan and comparing it with Hillary Clinton’s). 
 2 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 3 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 4 Id. at 2585–91. 
 5 Id. at 2593–2601. 
 6 Id. at 2601–07. 
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Ultimately, the holding of the Court produced some wins and 
some losses for the Obama Administration and the congressional 
coalition that passed the Affordable Care Act.  While the Court 
made clear that Congress did not maintain the regulatory 
authority to implement the individual health care mandate under 
its enumerated Commerce Clause power,7 it went on to hold that 
Congress did maintain the constitutional authority to do so under 
its power to tax.8  The Court also found that tying expansion of 
Medicaid to federal spending in the bill amounted to 
unconstitutional coercion of the states.9  
While there are many ways to analyze and relay this familiar 
tale, consider a new frame through which to view it: as a conflict 
over the allocation of constitutional resources.  During the 
Affordable Care Act conflict, as with virtually all constitutional 
conflicts, the push-and-pull for constitutional resources results in a 
number of outcomes: the distribution of constitutional rights for 
individuals and corporations, rules of governance, the allocation of 
governance authority among levels of government, and 
adjustments in the relationship between the government and its 
citizens.  Within this range of outcomes, we find parties who win 
and parties who lose in their bids to shape the meaning of 
constitutional language. 
                                                                                                                   
 7 Chief Justice Roberts stated: 
Construing the Commerce Clause to permit Congress to regulate 
individuals precisely because they are doing nothing would open a new and 
potentially vast domain to congressional authority. 
 . . . . 
 . . . Congress already enjoys vast power to regulate much of what we do.  
Accepting the Government’s theory would give Congress the same license to 
regulate what we do not do . . . .  [T]he distinction between doing something 
and doing nothing would not have been lost on the Framers . . . . The 
Framers gave Congress the power to regulate commerce, not to compel it, 
and for over 200 years both our decisions and Congress’s actions have 
reflected this understanding.  There is no reason to depart from that 
understanding now. 
Id. at 2587–89. 
 8 Id. at 2601; see also Tom Scocca, Obama Wins the Battle, Roberts Wins the War, SLATE 
(June 28, 2012, 11:59 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/scocca/2012/06/ 
roberts_health_care_opinion_commerce_clause_the_real_reason_the_chief_justice_upheld_o
bamacare_.html (asserting that the health care ruling was “a pretext” for a “campaign to 
rewrite Congress’ regulatory powers under the Commerce Clause”). 
 9 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2606–07. 
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The Affordable Care Act conflict involved at least two of these 
categories of constitutional resources.  The first and most obvious 
constitutional resource at stake was the allocation of governance 
authority between levels of government.  More authority for the 
federal government to dictate individual health care policy meant 
less authority for the state governments to do so.  It is no accident 
that about half of the states were plaintiffs in Sebelius.10  The 
second constitutional resource at stake, at least in the political 
dialogue surrounding the Act, was the distribution of individual 
constitutional rights.  Assumedly, the two individuals who brought 
suit along with the trade group are plaintiffs because of their 
concerns about complying with the law.  While the constitutional 
claims made by the parties are directed at the purported limits on 
Congress’s power and the relationship between the federal 
government and the states, the political outcome of the fight in 
many respects was the fate of the Act’s individual mandate to 
purchase health insurance.  
The Affordable Care Act conflict demonstrates that every 
assertion of a constitutional right or limitation on that right could 
be recast as a conflict over constitutional resources. Countless 
other examples illustrate the point just as well.  In the recent case 
NLRB v. Noel Canning, which concerned the President’s recess 
appointment power, the allocation of a different type of 
constitutional resource was at issue: the reach of one branch of the 
federal government relative to others.11  In other words, separation 
of powers issues can also be recast as involving the allocation of 
constitutional resources.  Similarly, cases like Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., which addressed whether organizations can opt 
out of certain provisions of the Affordable Care Act on religious 
grounds, involved the allocation of individual rights—yet another 
category of constitutional resources.12  
Framing these conflicts as competitions over constitutional 
resources not only helps us understand the drivers of 
constitutional conflicts better but also helps us more effectively 
apply the lessons learned from them in the future.  Ultimately, 
these conflicts share stark similarities with the conflicts that arise 
                                                                                                                   
 10 See id. at 2580 (noting that twenty-six states eventually joined the suit). 
 11 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2556 (2014). 
 12 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014). 
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regarding other resources—from natural resources to intellectual 
property.  A body of literature on the commons has helped us make 
sense of why resource conflicts occur in the natural resource and 
intellectual property contexts, how they may be resolved, and how 
they may be avoided in the future through better management of 
resources before conflicts arise.13  This literature is equally 
applicable to constitutional resources. 
Commons scholarship includes two particularly relevant 
literatures, one related to common good resources14 and another 
related to public good resources.15  Yet the two are interrelated in 
important ways, and the U.S. Constitution provides perhaps one of 
the most compelling case studies of this interrelation and how it 
both contributes to and resolves constitutional conflicts.  
Common goods are ones shared by many but that are 
depletable.16  Thus, when we engage in rivalry over common goods, 
more resources for one party means fewer for another.17  Rivalry 
over common good resources can and often does give rise to a 
number of problems: collective action problems for those unable to 
come together to manage resources properly, free-riding by some 
parties on the backs of those seeking to manage resources 
responsibly, over-exploitation of the resource, erosion of and 
instability within management institutions, and gridlock or 
rigidity in those institutions, which can in turn paralyze and 
undermine the effective governance of resources.18  As 
                                                                                                                   
 13 See infra notes 45–71 (surveying the literature on the commons). 
 14 Scholars have given commons different labels, including “common-pool resources” 
(CPRs) and even common property.  Margaret A. McKean, Common Property: What Is it, 
What Is it Good for, and What Makes it Work?, in PEOPLE AND FORESTS: COMMUNITIES, 
INSTITUTIONS, AND GOVERNANCE 27, 29–30 (Clark C. Gibson et al. eds., 2000). 
 15 See RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC 
GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 7–8 (1986) (highlighting the importance of studying “externalities, 
public goods, and clubs”). 
 16 Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom, Introduction, in LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL 
INTERDEPENDENCE: HETEROGENEITY AND COOPERATION IN TWO DOMAINS 13 (Robert O. 
Keohane & Elinor Ostrom eds., 1995); C. Ford Runge, Common Property and Collective 
Action in Economic Development, in MAKING THE COMMONS WORK: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND 
POLICY 17, 17 (Daniel W. Bromley ed., 1992) (“[C]ommon property provides a complex 
system of norms and conventions for regulating individual rights to use a variety of natural 
resources, including forests, ranges, and water.”). 
 17 Keohane & Ostrom, supra note 16, at 13. 
 18 See Brigham Daniels, Emerging Commons and Tragic Institutions, 37 ENVTL. L. 515, 
523–27 (2007) (discussing these and other issues implicated by rivalry over common good 
resources). 
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demonstrated in this Article, challenges related to the common 
good dimensions of constitutional conflicts can damage our 
governance institutions and even the meta-institutional 
constitutional structure within which they are embedded.19  
Public goods, in contrast to common goods, are shared by many 
but are not depletable.20  This body of scholarship has come to 
incorporate certain forms of knowledge and cultural resources as 
public goods.21  Thus, when communities come together to share 
knowledge or culture with each other openly and freely, they 
create resources that are themselves public goods.  Though there is 
a debate in the literature about whether making such goods 
private rather than public encourages or stifles knowledge-driven 
innovation,22 there is compelling evidence that in many cases a 
                                                                                                                   
 19 See discussion infra Part IV.C (providing examples of constitutional common good 
conflicts). 
 20 Keohane & Ostrom, supra note 16, at 15; see also McKean, supra note 14, at 27–30 
(distinguishing between common pool resources and public goods). 
 21 See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“The general rule of law is, that the noblest of human productions—knowledge, 
truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas—become, after voluntary communication to others, 
free as the air to common use.”); JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, at xi (1996) (“In market terms, information 
has significant ‘public good’ qualities; it is often expensive to create or generate but cheap to 
copy.”); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 18–20 (2003) (discussing how the public good nature of 
information has helped shape intellectual property rights); DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, 
THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 7 (2009) (“The idea behind the patent 
system is simple: invention is a ‘public good’ because it is expensive to invent but cheap to copy 
those inventions.”).  For an interesting critique and summary of this literature that relies on 
public goods in this context, see generally Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Public Good 
Economics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (2007). 
 22 Some voices in favor of finding ways to privatize the benefits associated with public 
goods can be found in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975) and 
scholarship like that of Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss.  See Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156 (“Creative 
work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the 
cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.”); 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP? Accommodating Intellectual Production 
Outside the Intellectual Property Paradigm, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1437, 1441 (2010) (“Since 
knowledge is cumulative, exclusive rights have always had the paradoxical effect of slowing 
progress in the name of promoting it.”).  We even see this perspective reflected in the U.S. 
Constitution.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”); see also ROBERT P. 
MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 11 (6th ed., 
2012) (noting that “[t]he principal objective of much of intellectual property law is the 
promotion of new and improved works”).  There are those who argue for keeping IP public 
good resources public.  See, e.g., RICHARD M. STALLMAN, FREE SOFTWARE, FREE SOCIETY:  
SELECTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN 9 (Joshua Gay ed., 2002) (arguing that 
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non-proprietary approach to pooling knowledge and culture 
creates public goods of great value.23  Such is the case with the 
Constitution, whereby communities come together to pool 
knowledge and cultural conceptions of governance to create a 
constitutional resource of which everyone can avail themselves—
everyone has a right, for instance, to exercise freedom of religion 
as understood in the canon of constitutional law, and no one 
citizen’s consumption of religious freedom depletes another 
citizen’s ability to consume the same. 
So how do these two literatures interrelate and what does this 
tell us about the Constitution? As described in detail below, 
constitutional communities capitalize on the public good aspects of 
the Constitution to pool knowledge and cultural conceptions of 
good governance and individual rights.24  The result is, for 
example, new constitutional conceptions regarding the individual 
right to exercise religious freedom.  These communities then 
engage in common good conflicts with other constitutional 
communities seeking to have competing conceptions incorporated 
in the canon of constitutional law.25  So, to take one example, 
Hobby Lobby believes that a constitutionally protected right of 
freedom of religion relieves them of the mandate to provide 
individual health care for contraceptives.26  Other constitutional 
communities disagree, and believe that there is no constitutionally 
protected right of religious freedom that would absolve Hobby 
                                                                                                                   
software “freedom” enables developers to share their improvements with each other more 
readily, which in turn leads to enhanced innovation); Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism 
in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 184 (2004) (“Because the care and feeding of 
the public domain is an important goal shared by everyone in the IP system . . . we ought to 
find ways to encourage this behavior.”). 
 23 See MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 1−21 
(2008) (discussing the idea that intellectual property rights are unnecessary and do not in 
fact encourage innovation); STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE 3 (2004) 
(asserting that “[o]pen source code does not obliterate profit, capitalism, or intellectual 
property rights”). 
 24 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 25 See discussion infra Part IV.C (noting several types of conflicts, including conflicts in 
cases applying free speech guarantees). 
 26 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014); see also Brief for 
Respondents at i, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354), 
2014 WL 546899 (“Respondents’ sincere religious beliefs prohibit them from covering four 
out of twenty FDA-approved contraceptives in their self-funded health plan.”).  
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Lobby from complying with the law.27  In Burwell, these 
communities battled over a common good.  The Court ruling in 
favor of Hobby Lobby28 allocated to them a constitutional 
resource—a constitutionally protected right not to be compelled to 
provide health care coverage that includes contraception.  Hobby 
Lobby’s opponents, on the other hand, lost a constitutional 
resource—the right to compel health care coverage that includes 
contraception even when those who would be compelled object 
upon religious grounds.  Yet once that common good constitutional 
resource was allocated by the Court, the resource cycled back to a 
public good—all parties can (presumably) avail themselves of the 
same right Hobby Lobby has gained, as long as based upon 
religious grounds, and no one party’s doing so detracts from 
another’s ability to do so.29 
This cycle from public constitutional good to common 
constitutional good and back to public constitutional good is 
important because it can tell us a great deal about how the 
Constitution has been managed, the types of conflicts that have 
arisen under that management, and how it should be managed 
going forward to avoid conflicts that could result in damage to our 
constitutional institutions.  
This Article will explore the dimensions of our constitutional 
commons that take on the attributes of common good resources 
and those that take on the characteristics of public good resources, 
and how constitutional communities come together to influence the 
allocation of each.  Part II first provides background and context 
on how the U.S. Constitution is one of the most compelling case 
studies to which commons analysis can and should be applied.  
Part III then provides background on the common good and public 
good literatures relevant to our thesis.  In Part IV, the Article 
explores how the literature on common goods relates to the 
allocation of power, rights, and other resources found in the 
Constitution.  Part V looks at how the literature on knowledge and 
culturally derived public goods and the communities that create 
                                                                                                                   
 27 See, e.g., Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2769 (outlining the principal arguments of the 
Department of Health and Human Services). 
 28 Id. at 2759–60. 
 29  See id. at 2775 (holding that “a federal regulation’s restriction on the activities of a for-
profit closely held corporation must comply with [the Religious Freedom Restoration Act]”) 
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2015 11:24 AM 
1004  GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:995 
 
them relates to communities who create and seek to legitimize 
different interpretations of constitutional text.  Part VI draws 
together these two literatures and discusses how they provide a 
useful way to construe constitutional history and conflicts.  It 
further provides important new insights into the institutional 
design of the Constitution and the implications of that design for 
its operation, quality, and preservation.  Part VII concludes the 
Article. 
II.  BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
The United States Constitution is short, but the history of its 
development from 1787 to the current day is the longest of any 
written constitution.30  Its text is seemingly straightforward, but 
judicial opinions, statements by politicians, and the work of 
scholars attempting to interpret the Constitution would fill 
libraries.  The Constitution was instituted as a framework for the 
governance of a handful of rebellious British colonies that had 
broken away from the English throne, yet it has become a model 
for nations all across the globe.31  How this modest document—
though revolutionary in its time—became a centerpiece and model 
of law and governance the world over is nothing short of 
remarkable.  
While the story of the U.S. Constitution has been told through 
numerous lenses—legal, political, and historical—scholars have 
neglected to analyze the Constitution through the lens of the 
commons.  This is surprising because political scientists, political 
economists, and legal scholars, along with scholars from other 
fields, often rely on the commons to justify why we maintain rules 
of governance in the first instance.32  We increasingly see commons 
                                                                                                                   
 30 See Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism Revisited 81 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1641, 1669 (2014) (noting that the Construction is “the oldest constructional 
document in the world”). 
 31 See Heinz Klug, Model and Anti-Model: The United States Constitution and the “Rise of 
World Constitutionalism,” 2000 WISC. L. REV. 597, 614–15 (asserting that the Constitution 
“is constantly used as an example and anti-model”).   
 32 Some of the classic literature in these fields includes ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE 
COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 30–31 (1990) 
(discussing examples of resource systems, including fisheries, bridges, and water basins); 
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968) (coining the 
phrase “tragedy of the commons” and asserting that “[f]reedom in a commons brings ruin to 
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scholarship focus on a variety of unconventional resources, 
resource systems, and communities of resource managers.33  It is 
time to rectify the scholarly neglect of how the commons relates to 
the Constitution and to include it within the growing body of 
commons scholarship. 
While those studying the Constitution have neglected the 
commons, it turns out that the commons yields important 
constitutional insights.  These insights range from how our 
constitutional commons has been managed in the past, how it can 
or should be managed in the future, and what characteristics have 
allowed it to endure for so long as a reliable, stable foundation of 
governance.  Furthermore, once we have identified the 
characteristics that keep our constitutional commons healthy and 
robust, we can undertake a more focused attempt to preserve those 
attributes that perpetuate the endurance of this most elegant 
governance document and avoid damage to our unique 
constitutional resources. 
In order to understand the implications of the Constitution as a 
commons, we need to take a step back and first understand what 
is meant by the commons and how it might apply to the 
Constitution.  Commons scholarship is a broad heading for 
research related to both common good and public good resources.  
Common good resources are those with two defining 
characteristics.  First, they are subject to rivalry, meaning the 
resource is depletable when it is being consumed by a variety of 
                                                                                                                   
all”); ELINOR OSTROM ET AL., RULES, GAMES, AND COMMON-POOL RESOURCES 19–20 (1994) 
(discerning three central questions that common-pool resources implicate); Carol Rose, The 
Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 711, 723 (1986) (surveying instances where a free commons, “accessible to the public at 
large,” has proved beneficial).  See also Margaret A. McKean, Success on the Commons: A 
Comparative Examination of Institutions for Common Property Resource Management, 4 J. 
THEORETICAL POL. 247, 248–50 (1992) (asserting that addressing the commons problem 
requires “not just regulation[,] but cooperation with regulation”); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., 
Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 242 (2000) 
(explaining the tragedy of the commons and identifying a trend in recent literature 
highlighting how “some commons do not lead to tragic consequences”). 
 33 There is a robust literature on unusual commons resources, often called “the new 
commons.”  For informative scholarship summarizing this area, see generally Charlotte 
Hess, Mapping the New Commons (July 1, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1356835.  See also UNDERSTANDING 
KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 15 (Charlotte Hess & Elinor 
Ostrom eds., 2007) (discussing knowledge commons). 
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commons “appropriators.”34  When demand for the resource is 
high, there is often not enough of the resource to serve all 
interested parties, creating winners and losers.35  Second, common 
good resources are characterized by non-excludability, meaning 
that no one can be denied access to the resource system—or at 
least substantial difficulties arise in denying those who want to 
access the resource system.36  Public good resources share the 
element of non-excludability with common good resources,37 which 
is why both public and common good resources may be deemed 
part of a “commons”—everyone has access to them.  Public goods, 
however, tend toward non-rivalry, meaning there is no depletion or 
very little depletion of the resource as it is consumed by 
appropriators.38 
So let us take these in turn, providing a more detailed 
explanatory background than provided in the Introduction.  How 
do common good resources relate to the Constitution?  We argue 
that there are a large number of appropriators—for example, the 
Executive, Congress, the Judiciary, the states, and citizenry—
attempting to access the constitutional resource system and 
jockeying to allocate constitutional resources.  As noted earlier, 
constitutional resources can come in a number of forms, whether it 
be a constitutionally protected right of the citizenry, an allocation 
of governance authority between branches of government or 
among levels of government, or some other benefit that can be 
derived through a particular interpretation of original or amended 
constitutional text.   
When a constitutional resource is distributed, a win for one 
appropriator results in a loss of that constitutional resource for 
another.  For example, before Roe v. Wade,39 groups fought over 
the allocation of general rights to personal liberty and the specific 
implications of women controlling their reproductive rights by 
maintaining access to abortion.  Once the Court ruled that the Due 
Process Clause of the Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment 
                                                                                                                   
 34 OSTROM, supra note 32, at 30. 
 35 Id.  
 36 Blake Hudson, Commerce in the Commons: A Unified Theory of Natural Capital 
Regulation Under the Commerce Clause, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 375, 377 (2011). 
 37 Keohane & Ostrom, supra note 16, at 13. 
 38 Id. 
 39 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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protected a woman’s right to an abortion,40 winners and losers 
arose—as evidenced by the intense, nationwide politics on the 
issue of abortion that we saw at the time, and that we still see 
today.41  Those who wanted a constitutionally protected right to an 
abortion were given that right and were able to graze on the 
metaphorical constitutional commons, but now to the exclusion of 
those opposing the allocation of that right.  In contrast, those who 
opposed constitutional protections for the right to abort were 
denied the right to have the Constitution interpreted in the 
manner they desired and were left with nothing more than 
constitutional stubble.42 
How, then, do public good resources relate to the Constitution?  
And how do they interact with common good resources to form the 
complete picture of the constitutional commons?  To convey the 
public good nature of constitutional resources, this Article 
incorporates insights from scholars who have recently shifted 
away from focusing primarily on how rivalrous resources are 
managed (and how appropriators potentially deplete or overuse 
resources) and rather have focused on how communities may come 
together to pool knowledge or cultural perspectives to create 
resources.  We argue that the communities described in the 
Introduction on each side of a constitutional conflict engaged in 
the creation of constitutional public good resources.43  Taking a 
signal from this literature, we can look at groups creating public 
goods in governance instruments, like constitutions, from a new 
perspective, and can call them “constitutional commons 
communities” or just “constitutional communities.”  Examples 
include the nation’s esteemed Framers at the time the 
Constitution was created.  In addition, we continually find 
constitutional communities made up of coalitions of citizens and 
interest groups that come together to litigate constitutional issues, 
judges interpreting constitutional precepts, legislators seeking to 
                                                                                                                   
 40 Id. at 164. 
 41 See, e.g., id. at 116 (acknowledging “the vigorous opposing views” and “the sensitive 
and emotional nature of the abortion controversy” in 1973). 
 42 See id. at 164–65 (establishing a timetable dictating when states could regulate access 
to abortion). 
 43 This brand of scholarship goes by the moniker “constructed cultural commons.”  See 
Michael J. Madison et al., Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment, 95 
CORNELL L. REV. 657, 657 (2010).  
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pass constitutional amendments, or agents of the Executive 
seeking to enforce the Constitution in particular ways—
communities we refer to as Reframers.  While rivalry between 
different communities pervades the traditional commons 
dimensions of the Constitution, constitutional communities also 
assist in managing and maintaining the public-good dimensions of 
the Constitution.  While these public-good dimensions share the 
non-excludability element with traditional and new commons 
resources, they differ in that they are non-rivalrous—one person’s 
use of the resource does not restrict another’s use of the same 
resource.  In other words, while different constitutional 
communities may differ in their preferences and visions of how 
constitutional resources should be allocated, once a resource is 
allocated, one constitutional community’s use of an allocated 
resource does not restrict another’s use of the same resource. 
So, for example, during the abortion conflict culminating in Roe 
v. Wade, constitutional communities came together to pool their 
collective knowledge on one side or the other of the rights-
allocation debate, seeking to maintain the right to abort (or not) as 
a public good constitutional resource available to the citizenry.  In 
contrast, the conflict itself was a conflict over a common good 
resource, as the decision in Roe actually created greater rights for 
those seeking an individual right to an abortion, and depleted the 
rights of others who would see abortion rights restricted.  This was 
the common good battle that led to the case.  Yet once the Court 
allocated the right sought by one of these constitutional 
communities, no one’s use of the right to abort restricted another’s 
ability to also access that constitutional right (or resource).  A 
judicial pronouncement allocating a constitutional resource, 
however, does not end the debate, nor does it extinguish the 
constitutional communities’ interest in continuing to seek their 
preferred appropriation of particular constitutional resources.  The 
communities often live on and thrive; some may attempt to ensure 
the maintenance of the constitutional resource as allocated by 
judicial pronouncement, while other constitutional communities 
remain resolved to see the right appropriated differently (i.e., 
seeking an overturning or a strengthening of Roe’s protections). 
Indeed, a key contribution of this Article is an explication of 
how the precepts established by both common good and public 
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good commons literatures are inextricably entwined in the 
constitutional commons cycle.  In this cycle, constitutional 
communities come together to pool their collective knowledge and 
cultural ideals to attempt to create public good constitutional 
resources.  At the same time, the collection of constitutional 
communities pooling knowledge and cultural ideals on one side of 
the constitutional resource appropriation debate are common good 
appropriators in rivalry with a group of common good 
appropriators on the other side of the debate.  
So, for example, in the context of the right to an abortion, even 
today constitutional communities come together to maintain the 
constitutionally protected right, while other constitutional 
communities come together to seek a reappropriation of the right 
that would not leave it constitutionally protected, but would rather 
allow individual states to ban abortions.44  The conflict over the 
allocation of the right in the first instance is a common good 
dimension of the Constitution, but on either side of the debate are 
constitutional communities seeking to gain (or deny) a public good 
resource or maintain the integrity of that right once it is allocated 
(or seek to have the right reappropriated with new winners and 
losers—i.e., those who would see Roe v. Wade overturned).  In 
other words, the Framers of the Constitution set up a system that 
is simultaneously rivalrous and non-rivalrous.  Once the 
Constitution was framed in a way that provided public good 
constitutional resources, we see a constant stream of constitutional 
communities acting as Reframers, attempting to adjust the 
original constitutional framework—generally by rivalry through 
judicial interpretation or constitutional amendment—in order to 
secure, nourish, and protect constitutional resources important to 
them.  
The next Part expounds upon the common good and public good 
literature, setting the stage for the remainder of the Article’s 
explanation of how the U.S. Constitution is situated within these 
respective literatures.   
                                                                                                                   
 44 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844–46 (1992) (describing the 
debate over Roe in 1992 and affirming the principles of that case); Tierney Sneed, What the 
Battle Over Abortion Will Look Like in 2015, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 31, 2014, 11:36 
AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/12/31/what-the-battle-over-abortion-will-look- 
like-in-2015 (describing state restrictions on abortions). 
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III.  COMMON GOODS AND PUBLIC GOODS 
This Part provides a short introduction to major concepts 
arising from the two branches of the commons literature most 
relevant to the Constitution.  It first gives an introduction to major 
concepts from the common good literature and then does the same 
for the knowledge and culturally-derived public good literature. 
A.  COMMON GOOD RESOURCES AND MANAGEMENT 
1.  The Resources: Traditional and New.  Common good resources 
share two characteristics.   First, when one uses a common good, 
there are fewer opportunities for others to use it, meaning there is 
rivalry among users.45  Second, it is very difficult, if not impossible, 
to exclude others from using common good resources.46 
These two defining traits of common good resources—rivalry 
and non-excludability—often collide in an unfortunate way that 
puts in motion a free-for-all that Garrett Hardin famously coined 
the tragedy of the commons.47  Hardin illustrated the tragedy of the 
commons by introducing a now-famous cautionary tale of hapless 
cattle herders grazing their cows on an open pasture.48  This 
pasture typified common good consumption: the herders’ use of the 
commons was rivalrous because any grass consumed by one 
herder’s cow meant less for other herders; the herders also faced 
challenges related to non-excludability because any number of 
herders could bring their cows to the pasture to graze as they 
pleased.49  Individual herders who added cows to their herd 
received a nearly 100% return for each additional cow, while the 
overgrazing caused by additional cattle was spread among all of 
                                                                                                                   
 45 See Keohane & Ostrom, supra note 16, at 13–15.  Sometimes this trait of the commons 
is also referred to as depletability, or subtractability. 
 46 See e.g., id.; Runge, supra note 16, at 26 (discussing the central features of common 
property, including the “[n]eed for enforcement,” which arises from the fact that it is 
impossible to exclude others from the commons); ORAN R. YOUNG, THE INSTITUTIONAL 
DIMENSIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: FIT, INTERPLAY, AND SCALE 141 (2002) 
(“[Common-pool resources] are goods that are nonexcludable in the sense that it is costly, or 
even impossible, to prevent all members of a group from enjoying their benefits once they 
are available to any member . . . .”). 
 47 Hardin, supra note 32, at 1243. 
 48 Id. at 1244. 
 49 Id. 
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the herders.50  As a result, herders invariably found it in their 
interests to add more cattle even as the pasture became so 
depleted that overgrazing tragically destroyed it.51  
In addition to the two defining traits of common good resources, 
other terminology helps guide commons analysis.  The body of 
resources that make up common goods is known as a “resource 
system.”52  A resource system is comprised of “resource units,” 
defined as “what individuals appropriate or use from resource 
systems.”53  The process of withdrawing resource units from a 
resource system is called “appropriation,” and those who withdraw 
resource units from the system are called “appropriators.”54   
Commons scholars have traditionally studied and applied the 
commons literature to natural resources, such as fisheries,55 
forests,56 parks,57 rivers,58 and airsheds.59  In more recent years, 
commons scholars have focused on additional natural resources 
such as the polar icecaps,60 the radio spectrum,61 and outer space.62  
The literature on the commons increasingly encompasses a host 
of other resources as well.   The types of common goods found 
                                                                                                                   
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Ostrom highlights “fishing grounds, groundwater basins, grazing areas, irrigation 
canals, bridges, parking garages, mainframe computers, and streams, lakes, oceans, and 
other bodies of water” as examples of “resource systems.”  OSTROM, supra note 32, at 30. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. Ostrom gives a variety of examples of appropriators, such as “herders, fishers, 
irrigators, commuters, and anyone else who appropriates resource units from some type of 
resource system.”  Id. at 31. 
 55 See, e.g., id. at 144–46; Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to 
Governing the Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 247–49 (2000). 
 56 See, e.g., Clark C. Gibson et al., Explaining Deforestation: The Role of Local 
Institutions, in PEOPLE AND FORESTS, supra note 14, at 1, 6–7. 
 57 See, e.g., Hardin, supra note 32, at 1245. 
 58 See, e.g., Michael V. McGinnis, On the Verge of Collapse: The Columbia River System, 
Wild Salmon and the Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 63, 75 
(1995). 
 59 See, e.g., Tom Tietenberg, The Tradable Permits Approach to Protecting the Commons: 
What Have We Learned?, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS 197, 202–03 (Elinor Ostrom et al. 
eds., 2002); Hardin, supra note 32, at 1245. 
 60 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER, GOVERNING THE FROZEN COMMONS: THE ANTARCTIC 
REGIME AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 1–2 (1998). 
 61 See, e.g., Daniels, supra note 18, at 545–50. 
 62 See, e.g., Jennifer A. Purvis, The Long Arm of the Law? Extraterritorial Application of 
U.S. Environmental Legislation to Human Activity in Outer Space, 6 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. 
REV. 455, 457 (1994) (discussing the failure of customary international law to adequately 
address the problem of space debris). 
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outside of traditional natural resources are often referred to as 
“new commons,”63 and include resources as varied as medical 
care,64 prisons,65 government budgets,66 email inboxes,67 federal 
systems of government,68 and even presidential primaries.69   
Below, we argue that a variety of resources provided by the 
Constitution, such as rules allocating governance authority or 
allocating constitutional rights to the citizenry, should also be 
considered new commons resources, as evidenced by the many 
rivalrous conflicts that arise between various non-excludable 
appropriators on the constitutional commons.70   
As Hardin’s cautionary tale suggests, common good resources, 
whether traditional or new, almost uniformly require management 
in order to avoid tragedy.71  As researchers have delved into 
commons problems related to resource management, they have 
discovered a broad spectrum of potential solutions to those 
problems.   
                                                                                                                   
 63 See, e.g., Hess, supra note 33, at 3–4; Brigham Daniels, Governing the Presidential 
Nomination Commons, 84 TUL. L. REV. 899, 907 (2010). 
 64 See Michael Gochfeld et al., Medical Care as a Commons, in PROTECTING THE 
COMMONS 253 (Joanna Burger et al. eds., 2001) (using the commons framework to analyze 
medical care in the United States). 
 65 See Talbot “Sandy” D’Alemberte, A Critique of Roscoe Pound’s Popular Dissatisfaction 
with the Administration of Justice: The Missing Discussion of Criminal Law, 48 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 969, 979 (2007) (“[J]ails and prisons are paid for by all of society, and those who use 
disproportionate resources from the commons through numerous prosecutions and long 
prison terms are taking from the commons.”). 
 66 See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Overgrazing the Budgetary Commons: Incentive—Compatible 
Solutions to the Problem of Deficits, in THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF GOVERNMENT 
DEFICITS 211, 211 (Laurence H. Meyer ed., 1983) (“[G]overnmental revenues and debt-
financing opportunities, like the proverbial commons, are a common pool.”). 
 67 See Nigel Melville et al., Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail: Empirical Analysis of a 
Digital Commons, 10 INT’L J. ELECTRONIC COM. 143, 144 (2006) (framing “[u]nsolicited 
commercial email” as a “significant problem of the digital commons”). 
 68 See, e.g., Blake Hudson, Federal Constitutions: The Keystone of Nested Commons 
Governance, 63 ALA. L. REV. 1007, 1007 (2012) (discerning a “natural capital commons” 
where “[f]ederal constitutions . . . grant subnational governments virtually exclusive 
regulatory authority over certain types of natural capital appropriation”); BLAKE HUDSON, 
CONSTITUTIONS AND THE COMMONS: THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL GOVERNANCE ON LOCAL, 
NATIONAL, AND GLOBAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 3 (2014) (asserting that the commons 
“theory has yet to be applied to . . . the federal system of government”). 
 69 See Daniels, supra note 63, at 907–08 (reasoning that “states compete for influence [in 
presidential primaries] because it is a finite resource” and that “it is very difficult for a state 
to exclude other states from trying to gain more influence”). 
 70 See infra Part IV.A. 
 71 See Hardin, supra note 32, at 1244–45 (describing commons problems and 
management solutions in the context of parks and the atmosphere). 
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2.  Managing Common Goods.  Regardless of the form the 
management system takes, the purpose of managing common good 
resources is to put some restraints on commons appropriators.72  
The management system might work to reduce consumption of the 
goods (i.e., rivalry) or to restrict access (i.e., non-excludability).     
Hardin highlighted two primary mechanisms to manage 
common goods and avoid its otherwise likely tragedy: property 
rights and regulation.73  Others, led primarily by Elinor Ostrom’s 
Nobel prize-winning work,74 have argued that herders under the 
right conditions can manage their own way out of commons 
tragedies.  Regardless of the mechanism utilized, commons 
literature examines the extent to which institutions created by 
those who use the commons can help them avoid having the 
commons “tragically” collapse. 
We now turn to a description of public good resources on the 
commons, and specifically focus on a much newer and important 
idea that knowledge and cultural information can be pooled to 
create public good commons resources. 
B.  PUBLIC GOOD COMMONS COMMUNITIES 
Just as the common good scholarship focuses on the challenges 
presented by the management of depletable resources, the 
scholarship on knowledge and culturally-derived public good 
commons75 (which we will refer to here as the “cultural public good 
                                                                                                                   
 72 See id. at 1244 (“Freedom in a commons means ruin to all.”).  
 73 Id. at 1245 (outlining these two options in the context of the regulation of national 
parks). 
 74 OSTROM, supra note 32, at 2–18 (describing management solutions to the commons 
problem and calling the suggestion that the only mechanisms to govern the commons were 
limited to regulation and property rights “uncritical[ ]”).  For a brief introduction to this 
aspect of the commons literature, see Daniels, supra note 18, at 519–20. 
 75 These types of public goods were introduced in an article by Madison, Frischmann, and 
Strandburg, and were referred to as “constructed cultural commons.”  Madison et al., supra 
note 43, at 657.  While the moniker “cultural commons” is certainly catchy, the term 
commons is used in the cultural commons literature in a loose and even metaphorical sense.  
Id. at 673 (“We draw on narrative and metaphorical approaches to legal and sociological 
questions, specifically by examining the metaphorical dimensions of the information 
‘environment’ and the knowledge ‘commons.’ ”).  For those who study the commons, this 
looseness of language and use of the commons as a metaphor may initially cause some 
frustration.  The commons literature has struggled with people saying commons and 
meaning different things, and significant efforts within the commons literature have been 
made to make sure that when somebody is talking about the commons, they mean a 
particular sort of resource and not something else, like a property right, community, or a 
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literature”) attempts to unravel some of the challenges of building 
communities that invest in producing cultural, social, and 
intellectual resources.  Instead of fisheries and forests, within this 
literature we find communities of people ranging from computer 
programmers to choirs.  The heart of this literature seeks to 
understand how and why these communities arise and sustain 
themselves in pursuit of creating, pooling, and sharing intellectual 
and cultural resources.76  This literature attempts “to identify 
those features of commons that are more and less significant to the 
success and failure of a commons enterprise.”77  As a point of 
clarification, we should also note that some of what is studied in 
this literature has already made a home in the new commons 
literature.  Consider, for example, what Charlotte Hess has 
labeled “knowledge commons,” which include universities, 
intellectual property, libraries, and open source software, just to 
name a few.78   
There are a few essential differences between the common good 
and cultural public good commons literatures.  First, while the 
common good literature focuses on the health of the commons, the 
cultural public good literature focuses on how communities work 
cooperatively to produce and distribute intellectual and cultural 
resources.79  
Second, the two literatures also attempt to solve very different 
problems.  The overarching problem with common goods is the 
tragedy of the commons, while the primary problem with cultural 
                                                                                                                   
governance mechanism.  See McKean, supra note 14, at 30 (noting that “the term common 
property seems to have entered the social science lexicon to refer not to any form of property 
at all but to its absence”).  In fact, it seems that it was for this reason that many within the 
commons literature have migrated away from the term commons and instead tried to use 
the term common-pool resource in its place.  Id. 
 76 See generally Madison et al., supra note 43 (analyzing how participants in these 
pooling arrangements structure their relationships and interactions).  
 77 Id. at 660. 
 78 Hess, supra note 33, at 20–28; see also UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS, 
supra note 33, at 14–15 (cataloguing several of these knowledge commons). 
 79 These distinct approaches inform how we approach the Constitution below in Parts IV 
and V.  When applying commons analysis in Part IV, we focus on the conflicts between 
appropriators of constitutional resources.  In Part V, on the other hand, when applying 
cultural public good analysis, we focus on how people come together in communities to work 
for change or to protect the constitutional provision of public goods. 
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public goods is the successful formation of communities that will 
produce and sustain cultural resources.80  
Finally, the role of rivalry plays out very differently.  As 
explained above, by definition, common good resources are 
rivalrous.  While cultural public good communities can create a 
diversity of goods, including private goods, common goods, and 
public goods, the goods described to date in the cultural public 
good literature are most frequently nonrivalrous public goods.81  
We now move on to discuss the ways in which the U.S. 
Constitution fits into the respective commons resource and 
cultural public good literatures.   
IV.  THE CONSTITUTION AS A COMMON GOOD  
In this Part, we discuss how conflicts over the content and 
meaning of the Constitution can be viewed through the lens of 
common goods.  While it is certainly a novel application of common 
good theory, it is an important one considering that common good 
dimensions may be significant contributors to both the 
                                                                                                                   
 80 In Part IV, we discuss how competition for constitutional resources, if unchecked, could 
tear at the fabric of the United States’ ability to govern or could undermine the stability of 
our governmental institutions, which would no doubt be tragic.  In Part V, we explain the 
ways in which coalitions form to pursue various constitutional changes—or to protect 
against them—and how the building of such communities conforms to the cultural public 
good literature.  Also, note that at least in some ways the literatures are not entirely 
dissimilar in their focus.  Collective action seems to be at the heart of the constructed 
cultural commons literature since the main object of our concern is building and sustaining 
constructed cultural commons communities; Ostrom also highlights the importance of 
building institutions that cause users of the commons to overcome “temptations to free-ride 
and shirk.”  OSTROM, supra note 32, at 15.   
 81 See, e.g., Madison et al., supra note 43, at 666 (“Despite considerable variation and 
nuance, these activities all can be understood to present a simple core problem: as public 
goods, the ‘output’ from these activities—whether described as information, expression, 
invention, innovation, research, ideas, or otherwise—is naturally nonrivalrous, meaning that 
consumption of the resource does not deplete the amount available to other users, and 
nonexcludable, meaning that knowledge resources are not naturally defined by boundaries 
that permit exclusion of users.”).  Again, these themes are highlighted below in Parts IV and 
V.  Furthermore, Part V describes how these commons and public goods aspects of the 
Constitution are inextricably intertwined, as groups come together and rival each other on the 
constitutional commons in order to create or reallocate public goods constitutional resources—
a dynamic which has not only forged our constitutional history but which will influence our 
governance system going forward.  In addition to explaining this connection, Part V introduces 
a revised version of Elinor Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
Framework specific to the constitutional context.  See infra notes 195–97 (summarizing 
Ostrom’s theoretical framework). 
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Constitution’s resilience and its potential weaknesses.  
Additionally, viewing the U.S. Constitution from this vantage 
point proves particularly important for the common good 
literature, since the Constitution may be a prime example of a 
well-managed commons and long-enduring institution.82 
In this Part, we first discuss constitutional resources that flow 
out of the “resource system” that is the Constitution, and how the 
push and pull over the content and meaning of the Constitution 
warrants common good analysis.  This involves describing the 
resources at issue and then discussing how the defining traits of 
common good resources—rivalry and difficulties presented by non-
excludability—relate to the Constitution.  Next, we provide several 
illustrations of such conflicts.  We end this Part with a discussion 
of how the tragedy of the commons could apply to constitutional 
resources.  
A.  CONSTITUTIONAL COMMON GOOD RESOURCES 
When considering the Constitutional Convention of 1787, some 
speak of the participants with such reverence that perhaps it may 
seem flippant to characterize them as appropriators of resources.83  
The same could be said about the impressive stream of 
constitutional cases penned by great jurists.  However, as 
litigants, interest groups, and politicians know well, any time we 
take actions to create new constitutional language or even 
interpret existing language, we find conflict.  The stakes of these 
conflicts have to do with the provision of important constitutional 
resources, such as the creation of citizen rights or the allocation of 
governance authority among levels of government or between 
branches of government.  During the Convention, appropriation of 
these resources worked through many rounds of disagreement, 
and then ultimately agreement on exactly what the constitutional 
text would be.84  Since then, appropriation of constitutional 
                                                                                                                   
 82 See OSTROM, supra note 32, at 88–102 (describing “a set of design principles that 
characterize [certain] long-enduring [common-pool resource] institutions”).  This is a point 
that the authors intend to explore in more depth in future work. 
 83 See, e.g., PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION 
1787–1788, at 467–68 (2010) (commending the Framers and participants at the state 
ratifying conventions).  
 84 See RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 155 (2009) (discussing disagreement on the “three-fifths” compromise); 
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resources has come either through amending the Constitution or 
through judicial interpretation of constitutional text. 
While the resources that come from crafting or interpreting 
constitutional language are diverse and difficult to encapsulate in 
their entirety, consider some of the landmark judicial opinions that 
have articulated the meaning of constitutional language, each of 
which has dimensions fitting within the common good and, as 
discussed below in Part V, cultural public good frameworks.  In each 
of these conflicts, the direction of the Nation stood in the balance. 
Cases like Bush v. Gore85 allocated rules governing aspects of the 
electoral system, while cases such as Marbury v. Madison86 and 
Nixon v. United States87 proscribed the degree to which one branch 
of the government has the ability to override the will of another 
branch.  Other cases, like Brown v. Board of Education,88 National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,89 and Kelo v. New 
London,90 adjusted the relationship between the government and its 
citizens.  Cases like Wickard v. Filburn,91 McCulloch v. Maryland,92 
United States v. Lopez,93 and Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.94 demarked 
                                                                                                                   
MAIER, supra note 83, at 35–38 (outlining the disagreements among the delegates and their 
reservations about the approved text). 
 85 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (holding that “[t]he recount mechanisms implemented in 
response to the decisions of the Florida Supreme Court do not satisfy the minimum 
requirement for nonarbitrary treatment of voters necessary to secure the fundamental 
right”).  
 86 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (establishing judicial review over legislative acts, 
including the ability of the Court to act as the final arbiter as to the meaning of the 
Constitution).  
 87 506 U.S. 224, 235–36 (1993) (holding that a Senate impeachment of a United States 
District Court judge is non-justiciable).  
 88 347 U.S. 483, 493–95 (1954) (holding that the “separate but equal” segregation of 
children in public education violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and therefore that state segregation of public schools is impermissible). 
 89 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012) (allowing the federal government to proceed with national 
health care legislation, including a controversial tax placed on individuals who chose not to 
purchase health insurance).  
 90 545 U.S. 469, 485–90 (2005) (holding that the governmental taking of private property 
to be given to a private party for economic development qualifies as a constitutionally 
protected public use).  
 91 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942) (allowing federal regulation to encompass wheat grown for 
private consumption).  
 92 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 429 (1819) (preventing states from taxing federal institutions).  
 93 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (limiting the power of Congress to regulate school anti-gun 
policies under the Commerce Clause).  
 94 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970) (limiting the power of states to regulate commerce when the 
regulation places an undue burden on interstate commerce). 
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the relative powers among levels of government.  Still, cases like 
Roe v. Wade,95 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,96 
and Miranda v. Arizona97 articulated substantial individual rights.  
Notwithstanding the motivations maintained by those attempting 
to influence the meaning of constitutional language, these resources 
are very valuable.  Irrespective of what form these resources take, 
they arise from the creation and interpretation of constitutional 
language. 
We now briefly describe why such resources are in fact common 
good resources. 
1.  Constitutional Resources and Rivalry.  Constitutional law is 
replete with rivalry98—the very existence of heated competition 
over the content and meaning of constitutional language suggests 
the existence of rivalry.  Without depletability, there is no need to 
have winners and losers: everybody could win without impacting 
other potential appropriators.  With rivalry, however, we are left 
with those able to graze on the constitutional commons and those 
left with nothing but constitutional stubble.  The throngs of 
protesters that accompany controversial constitutional cases 
before the Supreme Court, each with their own causes and visions 
for the country, cannot all go home happy.  This is the embodiment 
of rivalry. 
The dimensions of the Constitution that demonstrate rivalry 
and depletability of constitutional resources track closely the 
traditional common good resources studied by Ostrom and the new 
commons resources explored by others.99  Though public good 
resources “are not naturally defined by boundaries that permit 
exclusion of users,”100 constitutional common good resources 
consist of citizen rights and rules of governance that are naturally 
defined and do give rise to rivalry and depletability.  For example, 
when a resource like the appropriation of governance authority 
                                                                                                                   
 95 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that the “right of privacy . . . is broad enough to 
encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy”).  
 96 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010) (extending First Amendment political speech protection to 
corporations). 
 97 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966) (requiring police to inform individuals of their Fifth 
Amendment rights before interrogation begins).   
 98 See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text. 
 99 See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text (surveying both the classic literature 
and the new commons literature). 
 100 Madison et al., supra note 43, at 672. 
GEORGIA LAW  REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2015  11:24 AM 
2015] OUR CONSTITUTIONAL COMMONS 1019 
 
between levels of government becomes fixed in a constitutional 
document, or in the body of jurisprudence interpreting that 
document, it has fixed boundaries: we have fenced off the 
constitutional pastures and divided them between the states and 
the federal government,101 at least to the extent observed in some 
of the great federalism debates of our time.102 
                                                                                                                   
 101 Currently a constitutional debate is ongoing over whether the United States Constitution 
does indeed divide constitutional regulatory authority between federal and state governments. 
See Blake Hudson, Reconstituting Land-Use Federalism to Address Transitory and Perpetual 
Disasters: The Bimodal Federalism Framework, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1991, 2029.  This debate 
pits “dual” federalists against “dynamic” federalists.  Id.  Theories of dual federalism support 
the proposition that “the states and the federal government inhabit[ ] mutually exclusive 
spheres of power.”  Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in 
Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 175 (2006).  On the other hand, theories of dynamic 
federalism “reject[ ] any conception of federalism that separates federal and state authority 
under the dualist notion that the states need a sphere of authority protected from the 
influence of the federal government” and maintain that “federal and state governments 
function as alternative centers of power and any matter is presumptively within the authority 
of both the federal and the state governments.” Id. at 176 (emphasis added).  It is unclear that 
either of these theories alone provides an accurate descriptive picture of the operation of U.S. 
federalism today.  It is true that dynamic federalism is the status quo on many regulatory 
subject matters, but remnants of dual federalism arguably remain.  Id. at 175.  To illustrate 
the contours of these debates, consider the examples of the reach of the federal government (as 
opposed to or in conjunction with state and local governments) to regulate local land use 
decisions or management of forests on private lands.  In these areas the federal and state 
governments do operate as if there are separate spheres of governance, and whether this is a 
political or legal state of affairs is up for much debate.  Many perceive the federal government 
as lacking constitutional authority to direct subnational land use planning or direct private 
forest management activities, and until that authority is politically acted upon, a legal 
resolution to the constitutional question will remain elusive.  See Alice Kaswan, Climate 
Change, Consumption, and Cities, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 253, 297 n.4 (2009) (“Since the 
federal government does not have the constitutional authority to impose direct duties upon 
states and other subnational entities, federal legislation that impose[s] responsibilities on 
state and local governments would have to be carefully designed to avoid constitutional 
limitations.” (citation omitted)).  Of course, most dynamic federalism scholars are not actually 
debating the constitutionality of governance at certain levels, but rather observing that, for 
the most part, there is overlapping authority between the federal and state governments.  See, 
e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Foreign Affairs, International Law, and the New Federalism: Lessons 
from Coordination, 73 MO. L. REV. 1185, 1202 (2008) [hereinafter Ahdieh, Foreign Affairs, 
International Law, and the New Federalism] (“Concurrent federal and state jurisdiction has 
become the norm across an array of subject-matter areas.”).  As a result, most federalism 
scholars in this field do not question the constitutionality of policies but rather query what 
structure governance mechanisms should take.  For examples, see Kathryn M. Doherty & 
Clarence N. Stone, Local Practice in Transition: From Government to Governance, in 
DILEMMAS OF SCALE IN AMERICA’S FEDERAL DEMOCRACY 177–81 (Martha Derthick ed., 1999) 
(distinguishing between “government” and “governance,” and opining on how to improve local 
governance), BARRY G. RABE, STATEHOUSE AND GREENHOUSE: THE EMERGING POLITICS OF 
AMERICAN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 1–37 (2004), David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, 
Reorienting State Climate Change Policies to Induce Technological Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 
835, 841 (2008) (arguing that state action on climate change “has significant potential to 
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complement federal policies, and has certain advantages over them”), Robert B. Ahdieh, 
Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 872 (2006) (“[T]he goal is not to identify the 
single regulatory actor best suited or most appropriately charged with responsibility for a 
given entity or subject-matter.  Rather, multiple regulators are embraced as having a 
shared—if both competing and cooperating—place in a more inclusive and all-encompassing 
regulatory regime.”), Ahdieh, Foreign Affairs, International Law, and the New Federalism, 
supra, at 1202 (noting that “jurisdictional overlap is evident across the breadth of U.S. law 
and regulation” and that “emerging state and local voices supplement national power” in 
foreign affairs), Robert B. Ahdieh, From Federalism to Intersystemic Governance: The 
Changing Nature of Modern Jurisdiction, 57 EMORY L.J. 1, 6 (2007) (arguing that 
jurisdictional overlap “shifts the basic ground rules in regulatory function and design and 
motivates the creation of more complex regimes of law and regulation”), Joseph W. 
Dellapenna, Law in a Shrinking World: The Interaction of Science and Technology with 
International Law, 88 KY. L.J. 809, 881 (2000) (concluding that science and technology have 
changed “the intellectual structures that make up legal thinking in general and international 
law in particular”), Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What Is 
Motivating State and Local Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does this Say 
About Federalism and Environmental Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015, 1015 (2006) (noting that with 
respect to most environmental issues, the federal government plays a greater role than the 
states, but that the “tables are turned” with regard to climate change), David R. Hodas, State 
Law Responses to Global Warming: Is it Constitutional to Think Globally and Act Locally?, 21 
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 53, 53 (2003) (noting that policymakers at the federal level during the 
first Bush Administration tended to “oppose all efforts to control [greenhouse gas] emissions,” 
while “policy initiatives at the state level generally t[ook] the opposite approach” (footnote 
omitted)), Kaswan, supra, at 254 (arguing that “federal action alone” will not suffice to reduce 
energy consumption and control greenhouse gas emissions), Alice Kaswan, The Domestic 
Response to Global Climate Change: What Role for Federal, State, and Litigation Initiatives?, 
42 U.S.F. L. REV. 39, 41 (2007) (“In responding to climate change, the nation must confront 
profound institutional questions about the relationship between federal and state regulation, 
as well as the relationship between democratic processes and the courts.”), Barry G. Rabe, 
North American Federalism and Climate Change Policy: American State and Canadian 
Provincial Policy Development, 14 WIDENER L.J. 121, 128–51 (2004) (noting the emergence of 
the states in reducing greenhouse gases and discussing challenges to expanding state 
programs, including “uneven performance” and a “patchwork quilt of standards”), Judith 
Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s 
Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1670 (2006) (concluding that American judges 
simply cannot be prevented from relying on non-United States law because they “are 
influenced and affected by . . . judgments from abroad”), Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities 
as Actors in Global Climate Regulation: Unitary vs. Plural Architectures, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 681, 
681 (2008) (arguing that “U.S. states, cities, and other sub-national actors (SNAs) in the U.S., 
as well as abroad, can and should play important long-term roles in climate regulation at both 
the domestic and global levels, even after strong national and international climate regulatory 
regimes have been adopted”), Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., Individual Carbon Emissions: 
The Low-Hanging Fruit, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1701 (2008) (asserting “that prompt and large 
reductions [in greenhouse gas emissions] can be achieved without relying predominantly on 
regulatory measures”), Tseming Yang & Robert V. Percival, The Emergence of Global 
Environmental Law, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 615, 631 (2009) (discussing the “increased activism at 
the state and local levels when national governments fail to address critical environmental 
problems” and reasoning that increased “civil society involvement in environmental 
governance can serve as an important check on the economic and political influence of 
polluters”), Robert B. Ahdieh, When Subnational Meets International: The Politics and Place of 
Cities, States, and Provinces in the World, 102 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 339, 339 (2008) (noting 
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that “resistance to any place for state or local voice—let alone authority—has been quite firm” 
in the realm of foreign affairs and international law, but recognizing that “this may now be 
changing”). 
 102 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Limiting Raich, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 743, 
744 (2005) (describing the effect of the Court’s recent decision in Raich and characterizing 
the decision as a “setback” on “the value of federalism to protect individual liberty”); Eric R. 
Claeys, Raich and Judicial Conservatism at the Close of the Rehnquist Court, 9 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 791, 812–15 (2005) (discussing the Court’s division in Raich, and particularly 
the “rivalry between Justices Scalia and Thomas”); Christy H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, 
Commerce by Another Name: The Impact of United States v. Lopez and United States v. 
Morrison, 68 TENN. L. REV. 605, 605 (2001) (noting that Lopez and Morrison significantly 
curtailed Congress’s Commerce Clause power); Dan L. Gildor, Preserving the Priceless: A 
Constitutional Amendment to Empower Congress to Preserve, Protect, and Promote the 
Environment, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 821, 831–32 (2005) (“Basing the nation’s environmental 
policy on the Commerce Clause . . . is becoming increasingly suspect as courts, following the 
Supreme Court decision in 1995 in United States v. Lopez, have begun to narrow and 
restrict Congress’s ability to regulate local affairs nationally under the Clause.” (footnote 
omitted)); Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 1, 38 (2003) (noting that in a 2001 decision, Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook 
County, the Court “indicat[ed] its interest in closely examining challenged federal 
regulations for the requisite nexus to commerce or commercial activities”); Bradford C. 
Mank, Protecting Intrastate Threatened Species: Does the Endangered Species Act Encroach 
on Traditional State Authority and Exceed the Outer Limits of the Commerce Clause?, 36 
GA. L. REV. 723, 735–36 (2002) (discussing the Gibbons v. Ogden Court’s fairly expansive 
articulation in 1824 of the Commerce Clause power); Bradford C. Mank, The Murky Future 
of the Clean Water Act After SWANCC: Using a Hydrological Connection Approach to 
Saving the Clean Water Act, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 811, 844–46 (2003) (discussing how Lopez and 
Morrison curtailed the Commerce power, and noting the effect of these decisions on the 
SWANCC decision and subsequent cases); Thomas W. Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After 
Raich: The Case for Clear Statement Rules, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 823, 844 (2005) 
(arguing that Raich confined Lopez and Morrison to their facts); John Copeland Nagle, The 
Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 174, 178 
(1998) (questioning what kind of connection to interstate commerce is required for Congress 
to protect the habit of an endangered species, such as a fly); Lori J. Warner, The Potential 
Impact of United States v. Lopez on Environmental Regulation, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
F. 321, 364–65 (1997) (predicting how Lopez would affect federal environmental laws, 
including the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species Act); Omar N. White, The 
Endangered Species Act’s Precarious Perch: A Constitutional Analysis Under the Commerce 
Clause and the Treaty Power, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 215, 235 (2000) (arguing that Lopez 
“dictates that the federal government should maintain ultimate control of regulating 
habitat modifications that affect endangered species”); Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing 
Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the Federalist Revival After Gonzales v. Raich, 2005 SUP. CT. 
REV. 1 (discussing how the Raich decision affected federalism and the line of cases following 
Lopez and Morrison); Eric Brignac, Recent Development, The Commerce Clause 
Justification of Federal Endangered Species Protection: Gibbs v. Babbitt, 79 N.C. L. REV. 
873, 883 (2001) (explaining the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion in Gibbs “that Congress can 
constitutionally protect endangered species under the Commerce Clause” and noting the 
decision’s tension with Lopez and Morrison); Sara D. Van Loh, Note, The Latest and 
Greatest Commerce Clause Challenges to the Endangered Species Act: Rancho Viejo and 
GDF Realty, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 459, 461 (2004) (noting that the D.C. and Fifth Circuits, in 
Rancho Viejo and GDF Realty, concluded that Congress had “the authority to promulgate 
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2.  Constitutional Resources and Excludability.  The second trait 
of common good resources is that it is difficult to exclude potential 
appropriators.103  Within the context of constitutional law, the 
number of parties eligible to join in the fights over the 
interpretation of constitutional language is virtually unlimited, as 
the citizenry and their representative bodies maintain a high 
degree of access to other branches of government that interpret 
and shape the constitutional landscape.  This is certainly 
demonstrative of non-excludability.  Additionally, some of these 
fights occur with regard to ratification of amendments.  While the 
threshold to secure amendments is significant,104 the First 
Amendment actually secures the right of all the Nation’s citizens 
to advocate for political and legal (constitutional) change.105  
Regarding battles fought in courts across the land, the barriers to 
entry are quite modest.  One can enter the fray with a filing fee 
and a written complaint, though winning the day with a victorious 
decision on the merits, if within reach, may cost a good deal more.  
While some may find great difficulty in accessing the legal 
system,106 there is no dearth of constitutional litigation.  
Ultimately, none of the managers of common goods on the 
constitutional commons can be excluded from seeking inputs into 
how it is managed, as the Executive claims constitutional 
authority through orders and its administrative agencies, 
Congress legislates pursuant to claimed constitutional authority, 
                                                                                                                   
the Endangered Species Act under the Commerce Clause, even when applied to a species 
existing entirely within one state”). 
 103 See supra notes 46, 49 and accompanying text. 
 104 See U.S. CONST. art. V (requiring that legislatures or conventions in three fourths of 
the states ratify proposed amendments). 
 105 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”). 
 106 See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, In Pursuit of the Public Good: Access to Justice in the 
United States, 7 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2001) (“It remains true, however, that the poor, 
and even the middle class, encounter financial impediments to a day in court.  They do not 
enjoy the secure access available to those with full purses or political muscle.”); Russell 
Engler, And Justice for All—Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the 
Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 1987 (1990) (noting that “over 
eighty percent of the legal needs of the poor and working poor currently are unmet in the 
United States”); Scott L. Cummings & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Beyond the Numbers: What We 
Know—and Should Know—About American Pro Bono, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 83, 83 
(2013) (noting the essential role of pro bono services in the American legal system). 
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courts interpret the Constitution, and individual citizens sue to 
gain constitutional rights.107  
B.  FRAMERS AND REFRAMERS AS CONSTITUTIONAL RESOURCE 
APPROPRIATORS 
Historically, appropriation of constitutional resources has 
occurred in two primary ways.  The first deals with the trajectory 
set for the Constitution at the time of America’s founding.  Those 
who crafted and molded the Constitution that we still see largely 
intact today became known in common parlance as Framers.  
These are the individual citizens, representatives of state 
governments, and other interested entities who came together at 
the Constitutional Convention and during debates over the Bill of 
Rights to set the textual framework in place—a framework that 
has subsequently been molded and shaped by direct textual 
changes in the form of constitutional amendments.  The Framers’ 
constitutional text is the original fountain from which 
constitutional power, rights, regulatory authority, or any other 
constitutional resources have historically flowed.  Those who we 
call Reframers have subsequently come along to directly amend 
the constitutional text to change the shape and nature of 
constitutional resources. 
Yet, as constitutional lawyers, judges, and scholars would be 
quick to add, what the constitutional text explicitly states does not 
always resolve—or perhaps hardly ever resolves—the exact 
meaning of constitutional provisions.  As a result, Reframers have 
also played a key role in shaping and molding constitutional 
understandings through constitutional interpretation by courts or 
constitutional action by legislatures or the Executive.  These 
Reframers are lawyers, litigants, commentators, signatories of 
amici briefs, legislators, members of the Executive and the 
Judiciary, and others who influence constitutional litigation and 
its outcome, shaping and expanding upon the original text, 
providing for either new constitutional resources or new 
interpretations about the appropriation of existing constitutional 
resources.  As is clearly illustrated by the varied interpretations of 
                                                                                                                   
 107 But see supra note 106 and accompanying text (acknowledging the difficulties that 
individual litigants in particular might face in bringing constitutional challenges). 
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constitutional text, such as interpretations of the Commerce 
Clause108 or the Due Process Clause,109 this can be very fertile 
ground for those wanting to graze on the constitutional commons. 
C.  EXAMPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL COMMON GOOD CONFLICTS 
Consider the following two examples to illustrate how conflicts 
over the Constitution’s meaning look through the lens of common 
goods. 
First, consider the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, 
which provides simultaneously a governance resource and an 
individual right of the citizenry, stating “nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation.”110  What do 
                                                                                                                   
 108 For instance, the Commerce Clause has gone through four different eras.  It began 
with Gibbons v. Ogden, where the Supreme Court held that Congress had the power to 
regulate commerce.  22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 193–95 (1824).  In the next stage, from 1890–
1937, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of Congress’s regulatory power under the 
Commerce Clause.  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 162 (4th ed. 2013); see also 
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1895) (defining commerce as one stage 
of business, separate and distinct from earlier phases, effectively neutering broad-based 
regulation); Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 353–54 (1914) (holding that Congress 
could set intrastate railroad rates); A.L.A Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 
U.S. 495, 550 (1935) (declaring a federal law unconstitutional based on an insufficient effect 
on interstate commerce).  Quickly after Schechter, the Supreme Court changed tack and 
began allowing for more expansive Commerce Clause regulation by Congress.  See NLRB v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937) (upholding the National Labor 
Relations Act as constitutional); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125 (1941) (finding 
the Fair Labor Standards Act constitutional); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 130–31 
(1942) (finding the Agricultural Adjustment Act constitutional).  Lastly, in more recent 
cases, the Supreme Court has once again narrowed the ability of Congress to regulate under 
the Commerce Clause.  See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995) (holding 
that the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause 
authority); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 617–19 (2000) (holding that 42 U.S.C. 
§ 13981 could not be upheld under the Commerce Clause). 
 109 The Due Process Clause has expanded in recent decades with readings that find 
substantive due process rights for both family autonomy and reproductive autonomy.  See, 
e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that statutes that prevent marriage 
solely on the basis of race violate the Due Process Clause); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 
649 (1972) (holding that parental unfitness must be established individually and cannot be 
presumed based on the marriage status of a father); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 
U.S. 494, 499–500 (1977) (holding that a housing ordinance which did not allow a woman 
and her son along with her two grandchildren to live in a single family home violated the 
Due Process Clause); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162–64 (1973) (finding that state abortion 
laws that only allow for life-saving procedures and that do not take into account the 
mother’s stage of pregnancy violate Due Process); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895–901 (1992) (striking down provisions of the 
Pennsylvania Abortion Act of 1982 because they violated the Due Process Clause). 
 110 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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those key terms—property, public use, taken, and just 
compensation—mean?  No matter how we draw the boundaries 
and define the ambiguities, we see conflict, the outcome of which 
creates winners and losers.  If a court rules that a government 
action is a taking, then the losers are those who must compensate 
(governments) and the winners are those who will be compensated 
(property owners). On the other hand, winners and losers are 
reversed if the court rules that the government action is not a 
taking.  This division of winners and losers is the essence of rivalry 
over common goods.  Additionally, there is very little stopping any 
number of potential litigants from arguing that this part of the 
Constitution protects their property from one sort of government 
action or another, which is the mechanism by which non-
excludability rears its head.   
While we have a host of cases to choose from to make this point, 
consider the case brought by Jean Loretto, the owner of a five-
story apartment building in New York City.111  Ms. Loretto 
objected to a state regulation that gave private cable companies 
the right to maintain access to private properties, like her 
apartment, in order to attach cable boxes and wires for television 
service.112  Importantly, the regulation did not require cable 
companies to compensate property owners more than a nominal 
fee of one dollar if property owners did not voluntarily grant 
permission to cable companies to use their property.113  Ultimately, 
Ms. Loretto’s case ended up in the Supreme Court, and the Court 
read the word “taken” to include any regulation that facilitates a 
permanent physical occupation of another’s land, no matter how 
slight.114   
Ms. Loretto’s case adjusted the constitutional landscape and 
became an important component of its structure today.115  It 
provides a common good resource stream that creates future 
winners and losers (meaning governments who will be forced to 
                                                                                                                   
 111 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982). 
 112 Id. at 422–24. 
 113 Id. at 423–24. 
 114 Id. at 434–35. 
 115 See, e.g., Dennis H. Long, Note, The Expanding Importance of Temporary Physical 
Takings: Some Unresolved Issues and an Opportunity for New Directions in Takings Law, 
72 IND. L.J. 1185, 1188 (1997) (“The modern paradigm case of permanent physical takings 
is the 1982 Supreme Court decision in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.”). 
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compensate and private property owners who will be 
compensated).  The constitutional resource also provides an 
incentive for potential litigants to modify their behavior: state 
governments may think twice about facilitating a physical 
invasion of someone’s property because they now know 
compensation will be owed.  In this way, the Constitution bears a 
resemblance to Ostrom’s natural resource common goods,116 where 
instead of allocating the right of irrigators to access waters from a 
river, we see an allocation of governance responsibilities and 
fundamental rights. 
Second, the First Amendment of the Constitution guarantees 
that Congress will not make any law “abridging the freedom of 
speech.”117  The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution causes 
this restraint to apply equally to state governments.118  The 
meaning of “freedom of speech” of course creates winners and 
losers, regardless of how it is construed.  Those whom 
governments seek to silence will either be muzzled or allowed to 
express themselves, and those who would constrain another’s 
speech will prevail or not.  These clear demarcations of winners 
and losers suggest that rivalry abounds.  While there are many 
free speech cases to draw upon, consider as an example the case  of 
Gregory Lee Johnson who received a citation for violating Texas 
state law because he demonstrated outside the 1984 Republican 
National Convention in Dallas by dousing an American flag in 
kerosene and burning it.119  The case of Texas v. Johnson made its 
way to the Supreme Court, and in a 5–4 decision, the Court 
decided that the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of 
speech reached far enough to protect Mr. Johnson’s behavior.120  
The Court allocated a constitutional common good resource.  Of 
course, since those similarly situated to Mr. Johnson can avail 
themselves of court protection of their constitutional right, this 
interpretation also created a public good since the new and 
valuable constitutional resource is available to any who desire to 
                                                                                                                   
 116 Ostrom referred to these “common goods” as “common-pool resources” or “CPRs.”  
OSTROM, supra note 32, at 30. 
 117 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 118 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 415 n.10 (1989). 
 119 Id. at 399. 
 120 Id. 
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take advantage of it.121  The case also sets a limit on the types of 
actions governments can take when facing offensive protest 
messages—a metaphorical fence on the constitutional commons. 
D.  TRAGEDY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMONS 
If the Constitution produces streams of common good resources 
as the language of the Constitution is interpreted or altered, a 
question immediately arises as to what a tragedy of the commons 
would look like in the constitutional context.  Indeed, as is the case 
with a wide range of resources, a central problem of having valued, 
limited resources open for any and all to take is that a free-for-all 
might erupt.122  This free-for-all is frequently referred to as the 
tragedy of the commons.123 
We briefly address how a tragedy of constitutional commons 
resources can lead to serious degradation or even eventual 
destruction of constitutional resources.  This Part attempts to 
detail a few of these potential tragedies, though they have largely 
been avoided due to the Constitution’s status as a well-managed 
commons or long-enduring institution.  Even so, it remains useful 
to identify where our constitutional order is vulnerable so that its 
management can be better understood and strengthened, and so 
vulnerabilities can be remedied. 
We see the tragedy of the commons play out in at least three 
potential ways when it comes to constitutional resources.  First, 
the most predictable way for tragedy to manifest is in the form of 
erosion of governance, or the loss of credibility in governance 
institutions, as individual political appropriators seek to maximize 
their personal benefit.  While a coup d’état would be the most 
extreme and obvious example of this, the United States has never 
suffered through such an episode.  Yet, a number of constitutional 
crises occurring during our nation’s history can be fashioned as 
                                                                                                                   
 121 Because the exercise of the right at issue (i.e., burning a flag as a form of government 
protest) is non-rivalrous (i.e., one person exercising the right does not preclude others from 
doing the same), the Court’s decision also has a public good dimension.  This is a point that 
we focus on in detail in Part V.  In Part VI, we discuss how the commons and public good 
dimensions of constitutional resources interrelate. 
 122 See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text (documenting Hardin’s account of this 
problem). 
 123 See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text (documenting Hardin’s account of this 
problem).  
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symptoms of constitutional tragedies of the commons.  Such crises 
occur because of acute and unresolved disputes over the allocation 
of constitutional resources, such as disputes between branches of 
government (FDR’s attempt to pack the Court124), disputes 
between levels of government (the secession of Southern States or 
states’ refusals to enforce federal civil rights laws125), disputes 
between the government and the electorate (Bush v. Gore126), or 
disputes between the government and individuals (the Whiskey 
Rebellion127).   
While these seminal moments in U.S. history provide obvious 
examples, smaller crises are numerous and are also important.  
We find a modern example of this potential for erosion of 
governance in the ongoing debate over Supreme Court recusal 
standards.128  A number of sitting Justices have been publicly 
criticized for sitting before cases in which they may have a vested 
personal interest.129  This has given rise to concerns that faith in 
the institution of the Supreme Court may erode.  As Justice John 
Paul Stevens said in the highly visible setting of his dissent in 
                                                                                                                   
 124 See, e.g., Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale or Felix the Cat, 107 HARV. L. REV. 620, 
622 (1994). 
 125 See, e.g., Tony LoPresti, Realizing the Promise of Environmental Civil Rights: The 
Renewed Effort to Enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 757, 
812 n.353 (2013) (noting the refusal of southern states “to comply with relevant provisions 
of the 1957, 1960 and 1964 Civil Rights Acts”). 
 126 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 127 See, e.g., Saul Cornell, Mobs, Militias, and Magistrates: Popular Constitutionalism and 
the Whiskey Rebellion, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 883, 894–97 (2006) (describing the events of 
the revolt). 
 128 See, e.g., Louis J. Virelli III, Congress, the Constitution, and Supreme Court Recusal, 69 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1535, 1544 (2012) (summarizing the two major views in the debate 
over recusal); Dmitry Bam, Making Appearances Matter: Recusal and the Appearance of 
Bias, 2011 BYU L. REV. 943, 965 (arguing that “recusal [is becoming] more and more 
important to minimize the judicial bias created in the course of judicial elections”).  
 129 See Letter from 138 Law Professors to the House and Senate Judiciary Comms., 
Changing Ethical and Recusal Rules for Supreme Court Justices (Mar. 17, 2011), available 
at http://www.afj.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/judicial_ethics_sign_on_letter.pdf (calling 
for enforceable recusal rules for Supreme Court Justices); Nan Aron, An Ethics Code for the 
High Court, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2011, at A19 (criticizing Supreme Court Justices for 
appearing at political events and advocating for a higher conduct standard); Nina 
Totenberg, Bill Puts Ethics Spotlight on Supreme Court Justices, NPR (Aug. 17, 2011, 12:01 
AM), http://www.npr.org/2011/08/17/139646573/bill-puts-ethics-spotlight-on-supreme-court-j 
ustices (providing examples of occasions when Justices have been urged to recuse 
themselves from cases); Mike McIntire, The Justice and the Magnate, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 
2011, at A1 (describing the ethical issues posed by Justice Thomas’s relationship with 
Harlan Crow); Op-Ed, The Justices’ Junkets, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2011, at A14 (suggesting 
how Justices might avoid the appearance of impropriety). 
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Bush v. Gore, “[i]t is confidence in the men and women who 
administer the judicial system that is the true backbone of the rule 
of law.”130  The dispute over recusals presents risks that could lead 
to the loss of institutional credibility.  For example, if the Court 
were to take up the recusal question and decide that it had the 
sole authority to set its own recusal standards, it could create a 
public relations mess as it might appear that the fox is merely 
guarding the henhouse.  On the other hand, if the Court fails to 
stake out that ground, it facilitates uncertainty and also presents 
the prospect of the Court incrementally losing the public’s faith 
each time the Court faces questions of recusal.  Additionally, the 
public’s faith in Congress may erode if the public perceives that 
Congress did not sufficiently act as a “check and balance” and 
make attempts to reign in members of the Court who the public 
views as abusing recusal practices.  Of course, each time a member 
of Congress attempted to do so, this might also result in a loss of 
public respect for the Court.  Thus, both branches have credibility 
at stake, depending on how the constitutional resource is 
allocated. 
Another way this can play out is that the government may lose 
its credibility due to inconsistent shifts in how constitutional 
resources are allocated.  Shifts that are seen as too rapid, 
numerous, or flippant in light of the importance of the resource,131 
open the door to arguments about government legitimacy.  For 
example, the Court’s clarifying in Kelo that Fifth Amendment 
precedent had long ago transformed “public use” into “public 
purpose”132 was quite a jolt to a number of constitutional 
commoners, from private property advocates—committed to 
stringent checks on the government’s ability to appropriate private 
property for public uses—to environmental justice advocates, 
concerned that “public purpose” would be used by local 
                                                                                                                   
 130 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Baker v. Carr, 
369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s authority—possessed of 
neither the purse nor the sword—ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its 
moral sanction.”). 
 131 See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489–90 (2005) (holding that 
proposed condemnations of private property constituted “public use”). 
 132 Id. at 480. 
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governments to displace minority communities.133  Though states 
had been able to appropriate property in this manner for quite 
some time, the Court’s involvement in making clear the allocation 
of this constitutional resource caused a significant backlash, as 
evidenced by the forty-one states (at least) that subsequently 
passed laws restricting the government’s ability to appropriate 
private property under the circumstances of Kelo.134  Regardless of 
whether or not the Court was simply applying precedent, its 
credibility was called into question by a number of other 
constitutional commoners. 
These credibility concerns can even be witnessed on micro-
scales of constitutional law, as individual Supreme Court Justices 
have been increasingly criticized for being inconsistent in their 
legal analysis as constitutional commons appropriators jockey for 
constitutional interpretations over time. This, in turn, affects the 
credibility of the entire Court in the aggregate.  Consider Justice 
Scalia’s legal analysis in Lopez and Morrison and its arguable 
irreconcilability with his analysis in Gonzales v. Raich, which can 
be characterized as Justice Scalia not wanting expansive federal 
power in the gun control and domestic violence contexts, but 
supporting it in the context of regulating drug use.135 
We might also see erosion in the form of parties willing to trade 
institutional credibility for political points.  It is quite common 
that we not only see political differences expressed during 
                                                                                                                   
 133 Five Years After Kelo: The Sweeping Backlash Against One of the Supreme Court’s Most-
Despised Decisions, INSTITUTION FOR JUSTICE, http://www.ij.org/five-years-after-kelo-the-swee 
ping-backlash-against-one-of-the-Supreme-Courts-most-despised-decisions (last visited Mar. 
31, 2015) (“In the five years since [Kelo], there has been an unprecedented backlash . . . .”). 
 134 Edward J. López et al., Pass a Law, Any Law, Fast!: State Legislative Responses to the 
Kelo Backlash, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 101, 102 (2009); see also Ilya Somin, The Limits of 
Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2115 n.63 (2009) 
(putting the number at around forty-three). 
 135 Compare United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (invalidating, in an 
opinion by then-Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Violence Against Women Act by finding that 
sex-based assaults were not “economic activity”), and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
551, 565 (1995) (invalidating, in another opinion by then-Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Gun-
Free School Zones Act because the possession of firearms near schools did not have a 
“substantial effect” on interstate commerce), with Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 26 (2005) 
(upholding the Controlled Substances Act by finding that “the production, distribution, and 
consumption” of drugs has “an established, and lucrative, interstate market”).  See also Ilya 
Somin, Gonzales v. Raich: Federalism as a Casualty of the War on Drugs, 15 CORNELL J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 507, 508 (2006) (arguing “that the Raich decision is misguided on both textual 
and structural grounds”). 
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constitutional conflicts, but also that each political argument has 
the potential to digress into claims on both sides of abuse of power, 
overreach, and similar arguments that reduce the stature of our 
institutions.  Much of modern-day political rancor has devolved to 
the point that criticisms of a particular actor or particular act are 
spun as rebukes of the institutions themselves.  We might hear 
phrases like “politicians in robes,” “the do-nothing Congress,” or 
“the Dictator in Chief” thrown around with frequency.136  In the 
modern twenty-four hour news cycle where entire news networks 
are arguably devoted to spinning conflicts a particular way, and 
where snap judgments on the part of the public in support or in 
opposition to one side of a conflict are encouraged, constitutional 
conflicts might more frequently lend themselves to these tactics.  
Consider a few examples of many that we might list: Bush’s 
indefinite detention of enemy combatants pursuant to executive 
War Powers was framed by many as an unlawful expansion of 
executive power,137 as has been, more recently, Obama’s promise to 
institute a greater degree of gun control through executive 
orders138 or his attempt to grant of amnesty to millions of 
                                                                                                                   
 136 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, ‘Politicians in Robes’? Not Exactly, But . . ., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/27/us/judges-rulings-follow-partisan-lines.html?_r=0 
(discussing the effect of judges’ partisan affiliations in a Sixth Circuit affirmative action 
decision); Editorial, Do-Nothing Congress II: It’s Not a Compliment, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2013), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/26/opinion/la-ed-congress-worst-ever-20131226 (“Unless 
something changes dramatically in the second half of the 113th Congress, it will be the least 
productive in modern memory.”); Sher Zieve, Dictator-in-Chief Obama and US Congress 
Collaborating to Destroy USA?, RENEW AM. (Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.renewamerica.com/col 
umns/zieve/110823 (“We are now living in a dictatorial Police State that is completely 
lawless—save the laws Obama and his DOJ are making up on the spot as they so choose.”). 
 137 See, e.g., FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ JR. & AZIZ Z. HUQ, UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED: 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR 142–43 (2007) (opining that the Bush 
Administration’s assertion that the President could detain a person indefinitely by 
designating him an enemy combatant was unsupported by precedent and gave the 
President unlimited and unreviewable power); LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 
(3d ed. 2013) (discussing criticisms of the legal advice Bush received regarding his war 
powers, and focusing on the alleged misapplication of a World War II case); JANE MAYER, 
THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON 
AMERICAN IDEALS 70–71 (2008) (same); CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE 
IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 76 (2007) (stating 
that the September 11th attacks “provided an enormous opportunity to expand presidential 
power,” and that “the Bush-Cheney legal team aggressively seized the opening”). 
 138 See, e.g., Jeff Barnard, Rural Lawmen Take on Obama: Say Gun Control Is Illegal, 
COM. APPEAL (Jan. 17, 2013, 11:28 PM), http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/rural-law 
men-take-on-obama (providing accounts of local law enforcement officials who disagree with 
President Obama’s proposed ban on new assault weapons and large-capacity magazines). 
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immigrants.139  States viewed Congress as overreaching in 
attempting to regulate guns near schools in Lopez and violence 
against women in Morrison.  The U.S. Supreme Court has been 
characterized as grabbing power for those with political ideology in 
line with the majority opinion in Citizens United.140  In each case, 
swift and organized attacks were made against the institutions 
that sit at the foundation of government and at the heart of the 
Constitution, arguably for the purpose of shifting the political 
state of affairs in the other direction. 
The second way the tragedy of the commons may manifest in 
the context of constitutional resources is by creating government 
instability, or even the mere appearance of instability.  
Specifically, if too much rivalry over rights occurs, and 
jurisprudence shifts with the wind, this can lead to citizens feeling 
unsettled in their expectations of rights.  Though it did not devolve 
into a dire tragedy of instability, an example of the potential for 
instability might be found in the constitutional shift from the 
Lochner era,141 during which the Court invalidated as 
unconstitutional a number of federal and state statutes aimed at 
protecting the rights of workers, to the post-1937 era where the 
Court upheld the very same regulatory provisions as 
constitutional.142  Though the same constitutional issues were 
                                                                                                                   
 139 Don Thompson, California Sheriff Criticizes Obama on Immigration, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 
20, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/nov/20/California-shariff-critic izes-oba 
ma-on-immigration; Pema Levy, Republicans Say Obama’s Immigration Actions Are Making 
You Less Safe. So Why Are Cops All For Them?, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 4, 2015, 7:15 AM), http:// 
www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/02/obama-executive-action-immigration-public-safety;  
Impeachment lite, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 21, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/united-sta 
tes/21644174-republicans-are-resorting-dangerous-tactics-express-thei r-dislike.  
 140 See, e.g., James Warren, Richard Posner Bashes Supreme Court’s Citizens United Ruling, 
THE DAILY BEAST (July 14, 2012), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/07/14/richard-
posner-bashes-supreme-court-s-citizens-united-ruling.html (quoting Posner as saying that 
“[o]ur political system is pervasively corrupt due to our Supreme Court taking away 
campaign-contribution restrictions on the basis of the First Amendment”).   
 141 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 153 (1905) (finding a labor regulation to be an 
interference with the right to contract); see also Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 168–
69, 180 (1908) (striking down federal legislation prohibiting railroad companies from 
demanding that a worker not join a labor union as a condition for employment); Coppage v. 
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 6, 26 (1915) (striking down state legislation prohibiting companies from 
demanding workers not join a labor union as a condition of employment); Adams v. Tanner, 
244 U.S. 590, 591, 596–97 (1917) (striking down state legislation preventing privately 
owned employment agencies from assessing fees for their services).   
 142 The Lochner era ended with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 386, 400 
(1937) (upholding a state law that required a minimum wage for women and expressly 
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before the Court, what was once unconstitutional was suddenly 
understood as constitutional.  A continuance of these types of 
shifts in the authority of government and rights of citizens will 
cause instability, not only in the expectations of governments 
regarding their own powers to govern, but also the expectations of 
citizens regarding their own constitutional rights.  Similarly, if the 
U.S. Supreme Court upholds a congressional mandate that every 
citizen must purchase health care, and a subsequent court 
overturns that ruling, and a subsequent court reinstates that 
ruling and so on and so forth, then the constitutional common good 
resource is over-appropriated, disrupting the system and 
ultimately damaging the interests of commons managers.  What is 
“constitutional” becomes a subjective assessment by whoever 
happens to be in the seat of authority, rather than a firm standard 
to which Congress, the Executive, the Judiciary, and the citizenry 
must adhere.  A variety of similar scenarios might arise whereby 
rivalry over the shape of governance structure or the allocation of 
proprietary rights by any of the constitutional commons managers 
results in degradation to the democratic constitutional resource. 
The third manifestation of the tragedy of the commons occurs 
when too many rivalrous users enter the commons and the 
resulting fragmentation leads to gridlock.  The constant conflict 
over the allocation of constitutional resources can lead to nothing 
being done at all.  Similar to the early days of radio, with so many 
talking, “nobody could be heard,”143 and when factions become so 
disparate it may be impossible to run a government at all—which 
is arguably the case in our current federal government as 
evidenced by recurring events like the recent government 
shutdown.144  To be clear, gridlock itself is often political in nature 
                                                                                                                   
overruling Adkins v. Children’s Hospital).  See also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 
304 U.S. 144, 145–46, 154 (1938) (upholding governmental regulation of filled milk); 
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 486, 491 (1955) (upholding a state 
law prohibiting “optician[s] from fitting or duplicating lenses without a prescription from an 
ophthalmologist or optometrist”); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Nw. Iron & Metal Co., 335 
U.S. 525, 527–28, 537 (1949) (upholding a state right to work law). 
 143 Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1943). 
 144 See White House Office of Press Sec’y, Remarks by the President on the Affordable Care 
Act and the Government Shutdown (Oct. 1, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
the-press-office/2013/10/01/remarks-president-affordable-care-act-and-government-shutdown 
(“What’s weighing on the economy is not the Affordable Care Act, but the constant series of 
crises and the unwillingness to pass a reasonable budget by a faction of the Republican 
Party.”); Gail Russell Chaddock, Government Shutdown: Why Boehner Doesn’t Overrule Tea 
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rather than constitutional, yet motivating the commoners on 
either side of the gridlock are fundamental beliefs they hold about 
the role of our Constitution.  
For example, the nation is seemingly paralyzed on the issue of 
gun control.145  In Heller the U.S. Supreme Court spoke to the 
constitutional question, holding that the “right to bear arms” 
includes the right to own an individual gun for protection in one’s 
home.146  Yet those on the extremes of the debate (like the 
National Rifle Association), vehemently oppose even the lightest 
forms of government regulation (such as universal background 
checks).147  The NRA does so out of their view that the right to 
bear arms guaranteed in the Constitution should be free of 
government interference—despite the fact that the U.S. Supreme 
Court has said the Second Amendment right is “not unlimited” 
and has provided a list of presumptively lawful gun control 
regulatory measures.148  The reach of these limits is so far 
uncertain, but they could make up what some would construe as a 
slippery slope that could eventually trample the constitutional 
                                                                                                                   
Party Faction, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-De 
coder/2013/1004/Government-shutdown-Why-Boehner-doesn-t-overrule-te a-party-faction 
(arguing that the skewed congressional districts of some tea party members prolonged the 
government shutdown). 
 145 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Putting the Gun Control Debate in Social Perspective, 73 
FORDHAM L. REV. 477, 479 (2004) (noting the vehement disagreement between the two sides 
of the gun control debate).  
 146 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (“There seems to us no doubt, 
on the basis of both text and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual 
right to keep and bear arms.”). 
 147 Statement from Chris W. Cox, NRA-ILA Executive Director, Regarding Inaccurate NBC 
Story Alleging that NRA Won’t Oppose Background Check Bill, NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION 
INSTITUTE FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION (Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.nraila.org/articles/20130312/ 
statement-from-chris-w-cox-nra-ila-executive-director-regarding-inaccurate-nbc-story-alleging-
that-nra-wont-oppose-background-check-bill.aspx (“The NRA opposes criminalizing private 
firearms transfers between law-abiding individuals, and therefore opposes an expansion of the 
background check system.”). 
 148 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.  The Court noted that  
nothing in [the Court’s] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the 
mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places 
such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and 
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. 
Id. at 626–27.   
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right.149  On the other extreme of the debate are those who 
fundamentally believe that the Constitution does not provide an 
individual right to bear arms, notwithstanding the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Heller, and at the least allows significant 
government oversight and limitation of that right.150  Yet there are 
so many factions on each side and in between jockeying for their 
position that from a political perspective very little can be 
accomplished, and at present we end up having hardly any 
“governance” of gun ownership at all.151  Factions are afraid to give 
up any constitutional ground at all for fear that the entire 
constitutional right may be taken away, and thus we get gridlock.  
Another example of gridlock is the inability of the 112th 
Congress to pass formerly routine provisions like those related to 
the debt ceiling, and the political posturing that pitches the issue 
of spending cuts and the issue of tax increases in a mutually 
exclusive tone.152  While the balance of spending cuts and tax 
increases is a political question and not a constitutional question 
per se, it finds its roots, in part, in the constitutional worldview of 
constitutional commoners—those who believe the Constitution 
provides for an expansive government and those who believe it 
was intended to facilitate limited governance.  While in the 1970s 
Congress was able to come together in a bipartisan manner to pass 
a number of important environmental statutes,153 small 
government factions today are contributing to gridlock by calling 
for abolishment of the Environmental Protection Agency while big 
government factions are calling for more federal regulation of 
                                                                                                                   
 149 See Dennis A. Henigan, The Heller Paradox, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1171, 1205 (2009) 
(describing the prevalence of the slippery slope argument in the gun control debate after 
Heller). 
 150 See id. at 1209 (arguing that in Heller the “Court defied constitutional text and history 
to create a new private right to be armed”). 
 151 See generally Erica Goode & Cheryl Gay Stolberg, Legal Curbs Said to Hamper A.T.F. 
in Gun Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2012, at A1 (arguing that the ATF is unable to do its 
job as a result of “politically driven laws that make its job harder and [because of] the 
ferocity of the debate over gun regulation”). 
 152 See generally Jackie Calmes, As a Debt Battle Looms, Some See No Option But to Raise 
Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2012, at A12 (stating that President Obama would never again 
agree to a “plan to reduce annual deficits with spending cuts and no tax increases,” and 
explaining the positions staked out by the President and House Speaker John Boehner). 
 153 See Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy in 
Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 623–25 (2006) (listing the numerous environmental 
laws Congress passed during the 1970s, including the Clean Air Act). 
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2015 11:24 AM 
1036  GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:995 
 
domestic carbon.154  These countervailing constitutional 
worldviews on the proper size of government continue to push each 
side farther apart, with the result that neither side is likely to get 
what it wants.  This is the essence of gridlock.  While the Framers 
of the Constitution designed it to facilitate slow, deliberate 
changes in constitutional processes and governance,155 the tactics 
we see, like stalling, subversion, and spin trumping deliberate 
governance, are symptoms of the tragedy of the constitutional 
commons.   
We now move on to discuss dimensions of the Constitution that 
take on characteristics of public good resources. 
V.  THE CONSTITUTION AS A PUBLIC GOOD 
As discussed in Part IV, the history of the Constitution has 
been defined by rivalry over the resources it provides, creating 
winners and losers as citizens, states, Congress, U.S. presidents, 
and the Judiciary jockey for position and control of resources on 
the constitutional commons.  This is undoubtedly an important 
dimension of the Constitution. Yet, we find another dimension of 
the Constitution that is useful in explaining not only why we see 
political players jockeying for influence over the text and 
interpretation of the Constitution, but also why we find 
communities springing up, persisting, and organizing around a 
shared vision of the form constitutional governance ought to take.  
Such collaborative and energized group efforts stand in stark 
contrast to the typical world of common goods, where temptations 
to “free-ride and shirk” are seemingly ever present.156  This Part 
leads us to a discussion that is at the heart of the scholarship on 
cultural public goods and the communities that come together to 
pool knowledge and expertise in an effort to create and maintain 
public goods.  Of course, our particular focus is how this 
scholarship relates to the Constitution.  
                                                                                                                   
 154 Id. at 629–31 (describing “[t]he lack of congressional engagement in modern 
environmental legislation” and lamenting that “[m]any pressing environmental issues have 
not been addressed”). 
 155 Michael J. Teter, Congressional Gridlock’s Threat to Separation of Powers, 2013 WIS. L. 
REV. 1097, 1108–11 (arguing that the Framers intended a temperate, deliberate lawmaking 
system, but not a gridlocked one). 
 156 See OSTROM, supra note 32, at 15. 
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A.  CONSTITUTIONAL COMMUNITIES AND PUBLIC GOODS 
Building off of the scholarship of Professors Michael Madison, 
Brett Frischmann, and Katherine Strandburg, we turn to the topic 
of public goods resources and the communities that arise and come 
together to pool knowledge in an attempt to create resources 
valuable to society.157   
Certainly, it is easy to argue that the origin of constitutional 
text and its meaning came about by a group effort.  How else 
would one even go about describing the Constitutional Convention 
if not by discussing the delegation laboring through that 
sweltering summer in Philadelphia?158  It is hard to argue that 
constitutional meaning arises from anything other than the 
debates of a multitude of constitutional commoners, and is most 
often articulated by the shared voices of those within the various 
branches of government.  So, while at first glance the text and 
meaning of the Constitution may be an unusual example of a 
cultural public good resource, it does not seem entirely 
unanticipated by the literature.159  
                                                                                                                   
 157 A few years ago, these three scholars initiated a conversation about how the work of 
Ostrom and other commons scholars related to exploring “the construction of commons in 
the cultural environment.”  Madison et al., supra note 43, at 657.  Their focus related to 
what they termed “constructed cultural commons,” which “refers to environments for 
developing and distributing cultural and scientific knowledge through institutions that 
support pooling and sharing that knowledge in a managed way, much as a natural resource 
commons refers to the type of managed sharing environment for natural resources.”  Id. at 
659.  Because the goods at issue in this Part are non-rivalrous, we use the term public good 
resources rather than constructed cultural commons.  Evident in Madison et al.’s 
scholarship is their primary focus on communities that develop intellectual property, 
broadly defined.  For example, topics at the core of their analysis are communities that 
come together to create things such as open-source software, community-driven content 
found on websites like Wikipedia, and pooled recipes that together make up a cookbook.  Id. 
at 660–63.  Yet there are other types of communities that might fall under this theoretical 
construct that come together for cultural purposes other than pooling scientific knowledge 
or creating intellectual property.  Not surprisingly, our particular interest relates to groups 
that come together to shape our understanding of the Constitution. 
 158 See William K. Stevens, Behind the Scenes in 1787: Secrecy in the Heat, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 25, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/05/25/us/behind-the-scenes-in-187-secrecy-in-
the-heat.html (providing context for the Convention’s meetings in Philadelphia and noting 
that the summer weather “was the worst in nearly 40 years”). 
 159 Viewed through the lens that Madison et al. provide for such communities, one could 
easily argue that the Framers were engaged in a collective intellectual pursuit designed to 
develop cultural institutions to manage and organize society and its myriad of natural and 
human capital resources.  Constitutional Reframers still are engaged in that pursuit.  See 
supra Part IV.B.  Indeed, Madison et al. describe their framework as “relevant to property 
law, in particular, and social ordering, more generally.”  Madison et al., supra note 43, at 
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In studying a cultural public good, one of the most relevant 
lines of analysis is the makeup of the community seeking to create 
it.160  Members of constitutional communities pool their collective 
knowledge and experience in hopes of shaping and managing 
constitutional resources.  The most dominant constitutional 
community actors include the three branches of government, the 
states, interest groups, and the citizenry in general.  These actors 
shape the rules for access to constitutional resources and 
determine the constitutional conflicts that receive attention.161 
Constitutional communities pool collective knowledge with a 
view toward the allocation and maintenance of a wide range of 
governance rights and obligations.  In other words, constitutional 
communities may be working together in a non-rivalrous way to 
“defeat” the social ordering and rights preferences sought by 
opposing, rivalrous constitutional communities.162  In this way, 
constitutional communities can come together to facilitate the 
common good attributes of the Constitution, as one community’s 
success leads to another’s loss.163  This, of course, is one of the core 
ambitions in drafting a Constitution in the first place—to provide 
                                                                                                                   
664.  While the Constitution does not fit into the core of the model developed by Madison et 
al., it fits into the broader set of communities that the authors hoped would be studied using 
their analytical lens.  See id. at 708–09. 
 160 Madison et al., supra note 43, at 689. 
 161 Most typically, cultural public good scholarship keys on communities focused on 
building intellectual resources.  Constitutional communities are quite different in their 
focus.  For example, a typical IP-focused community works to produce IP resources in a 
collaborative way that disregards the mechanisms typically relied upon by those in the 
competitive market or made available through government regulation.  See, e.g., id. at 661 
(describing open source software as “maintained by a volunteer collaborative of individual 
programmers”).  Madison et al. argue,  
[a]t the core of IP law, as traditionally conceived, is the right to exclude, 
without which it is assumed that some producers would abandon their 
efforts for fear of free riding (unlicensed sharing) by competitors.  Without 
exclusion, competition facilitated by sharing would undermine incentives to 
invest in the production, development and/or dissemination of some 
resources in the first place.   
Id. at 667 (footnote omitted). 
  The cultural public good literature questions this assumption and focuses on 
communities that can come together to create public good intellectual and cultural 
resources and, more particularly, communities that are willing to create those resources 
without claiming proprietary rights or private market values in them (or at least not 
claiming as many of them).  See id. at 708 (asserting that “pools of information 
resources . . . serv[e] as alternatives to purely private rights of exclusion”). 
 162 This point is elaborated upon in greater detail below.  See infra Part VI.A.2.a. 
 163 Common good resources are described in Part III. 
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a stable and law abiding society with both certainty regarding the 
nature of rights and the ability to reallocate those rights to meet 
societal needs.  
Ultimately, a firm allocation of rights and rules of governance 
that constitutional communities may work toward is indispensable 
to creating a stable society and the rules of social ordering upon 
which society depends.  Rights—such as the right to vote or not, 
the right to have an abortion or not, or the right to be subject to an 
individual health care mandate or not—are each firm allocations 
of rights and obligations.  These rights and obligations may be 
allocated directly by the text of the Constitution itself, as in the 
case of voting,164 or rather by the Judiciary through constitutional 
interpretation, as in the case of abortion (under the fundamental 
right of privacy)165 and health care mandates (under the power to 
tax).166  Once these rights are distributed via constitutional law, 
social ordering arises whereby the right or obligation (i.e., the 
constitutional resource) has been allocated from the constitutional 
commons, and at which point it becomes available to various 
community actors to utilize without depleting the constitutional 
resource base.167  
                                                                                                                   
 164 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
 165 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 166 See Nat’l Fed’n of Ind. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012). 
 167 Note that while much of our thinking on public good resources has been shaped by the 
work of Madison et al., application of their scholarship has some limits because it was 
primarily written with a very different set of problems in mind—those arising out of the IP 
context in particular.  For example, the three scholars argue that government intervention 
may be misplaced in the traditional view of IP law.  Madison et al., supra note 43, at 665 
(“We suspect that over time the constructed cultural commons framework will yield a far 
larger and richer set of commons cases in the cultural context than one might discover by 
focusing only on patent law or scientific research or software development.  We anticipate 
that social ordering both depends on and generates a wide variety of formal and informal 
institutional arrangements, and that the logical and normative priority assigned to 
proprietary rights and government intervention may turn out to be misplaced.”).  In 
contrast, government intervention is often the very goal sought by constitutional 
communities.  These communities seek to provide a higher level construct in which the 
government operates and resolves disputes between citizens, between levels of government, 
and between citizens and the government—largely through the allocation of proprietary 
authority and rights.  While it seems to fall outside of the thrust of Madison et al.’s 
scholarship, it is in fact at least arguable that this aspect of the Constitution is perhaps the 
most profound type of constructed cultural commons because it establishes the framework 
that provides all three of the primary natural resource commons solutions—government 
regulation, privatization, and Ostrom’s successful collective action model.  See OSTROM, 
supra note 32, at 12–18 (outlining these solutions).  Each of these is subsumed under the 
constructed cultural commons that is the Constitution.  In other words, private property 
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B.  CONSTITUTIONAL PUBLIC GOOD RESOURCES 
When discussing communities that work to create public goods, 
Professors Madison, Frischmann, and Strandburg note that the set 
of resources being pooled is crucial to determining the nature and 
motivation of the communities that come together to create 
them.168  Constitutional communities come together to pool 
knowledge regarding the allocation of citizens’ rights and rules of 
governance which structure the relationships among the branches 
of government, between the government and its citizens, and 
among levels of government. 
So how do the constitutional communities highlighted create 
public goods in the constitutional context?  The answer is found in 
the actions that might be taken by a variety of constitutional 
commoners.  Congress, for example, comes together to establish 
constitutionally validated laws of which all citizens can avail 
themselves without detracting from the rights of other citizens to 
do so.  The Executive administers and enforces the laws of 
Congress, ensuring that one citizen’s consumption of a 
constitutional resource does not diminish another’s consumption of 
the same or other constitutional resources.  The Judiciary 
interprets the constitutionality of legislative, executive, state, and 
citizen actions in order to preserve constitutional public goods.  
States exercise police powers and may come together to either 
challenge or cooperate with the federal government in its exercise 
of powers providing constitutional public goods to the citizenry.  
The citizenry, in turn, may bring legal action through the judicial 
system, exert political influence to shape the work of Congress and 
the Executive, and attempt to amend the Constitution through 
legal (i.e., constitutional) processes in order to ensure that the 
constitutional rights they maintain remain in a state of non-
rivalry.169 
                                                                                                                   
rights, the governments that set rules and allocate rights, and even the citizens with 
freedom to operate under Ostrom’s model all operate under the auspices of our written and 
interpreted Constitution. 
 168 Madison et al. indicate that one should assess the goals or objectives constructed 
cultural commons communities maintain.  Madison et al., supra note 43, at 689; see also id. 
at 691 (“[I]t is important to identify the particular problem or problems that a given 
commons is constructed to address.”). 
 169 This stands in contrast to the way that Madison et al. characterize the IP communities 
that garner most of their attention.  So in the IP context, communities come together to 
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So, for example, the resources that constitutional communities 
come together to create, alter, and promote may be: property 
rights (as in the case of the Fifth amendment);170 civil rights and 
liberties (as with the right to privacy and abortion);171 allocation of 
governance rules and authority between levels of government (as 
with the Commerce Clause),172 between branches of government 
(as with the executive veto),173 and between the government and 
                                                                                                                   
create IP knowledge resources that are available to all, and one person’s creation or 
“ownership” of those knowledge resources does not limit another’s ability to contribute his 
own, nor does one’s use of that knowledge resource detract from—or rival—another’s use.  
See, e.g., Madison et al, supra note 43, at 691 (“A copyrighted work or patented invention 
can be “used” simultaneously by many people while it is part of a commons without 
diminishing its availability for others.”). 
 170 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982) (holding 
that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires compensation for “minor but 
permanent physical occupation[s] of an owner’s property”); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 394–95 (1922) (holding that a statute that annulled a contract 
allowing a coal company to mine the plaintiffs’ land took the company’s property without 
due process of law); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978) 
(concluding that “the application of New York City’s Landmarks Law,” where the plaintiff 
owner failed to receive approval for construction of an office building over Grand Central 
Terminal, did not constitute “a ‘taking’ of appellants’ property”); Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (“[W]hen the owner of real property has been 
called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, 
that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.”); Palazzolo v. 
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 629–30 (2001) (“[A] regulation that otherwise would be 
unconstitutional absent compensation is not transformed into a background principle of the 
State’s law by mere virtue of the passage of title.”); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. 
Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 306, 342 (2002) (declining to apply a bright-line 
rule in determining whether a taking occurred when a planning agency imposed a 
moratorium on development to devise “a comprehensive land-use plan”); Haw. Hous. Auth. 
v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231–32 (1984) (holding that the Public Use Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment does not prohibit a state “from taking, with just compensation, title in real 
property from lessors and transferring it to lessees in order to reduce the concentration of 
ownership of fees simple”); Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472, 490 (2005) 
(finding that the city’s exercise of eminent domain power to acquire private property from 
unwilling owners for use in development of a development project qualified as a public use 
within the meaning of the Takings Clause). 
 171 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (overturning a Connecticut 
law criminalizing birth control because the Due Process Clause included marital privacy); 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that there is a right to privacy, and 
concluding that this encompasses a right to have an abortion, based on substantive due 
process); see also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
846 (1992) (upholding the right to an abortion, with some limits). 
 172 See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 173 See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 421 (1998) (striking down the line-item 
veto as a violation of the Presentment Clause). 
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its citizens (as in the right of freedom of religion);174 and rules of 
judicial remedy to allow enforcement of those rights and rules 
(such as the right to due process).175  Each of these are public 
goods, because governmental or citizen consumption of the 
constitutional right or rule does not deplete the availability of the 
right or rule for others to consume: that is the very nature of 
constitutional judicial precedent.  These resources remain public 
goods despite the fact that commons resource battles had to take 
place to achieve their allocation.176  But once a Fifth Amendment 
right to just compensation is established,177 for example, no one 
person’s exercise of that right reduces the availability of that 
property right for another.  No one corporation’s consumption of 
the First Amendment right to be considered a “person”178 reduces 
another corporation’s ability to do so.  No one state’s consumption 
of freedom from federal government interference in the regulation 
of guns near schools179 reduces another state’s consumption of that 
resource.  The list could go on, describing the public good rights 
and governance rules created by constitutional communities that 
come together to pool knowledge and experience to affect 
                                                                                                                   
 174 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1878) (holding that religious 
beliefs cannot protect an individual from criminal statutes); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 
U.S. 296, 306 (1940) (holding that a licensing system for religious solicitations violated the 
Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 
U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (holding that strict scrutiny was the appropriate test to determine 
whether laws burdening religion were valid); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 875, 
882 (1990) (upholding a state law criminalizing the use of peyote, despite respondents’ 
contention that it was solely for religious use). 
 175 See supra note 109 and accompanying text on the Due Process Clause as it relates to so 
called “fundamental rights.”  Due process has also been extended to economic substantive 
due process.  See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) 
(holding in part that the “day is gone” when the Supreme Court strikes down state laws 
which regulate business). 
 176 This point is further developed below.  See infra Part VI.A.4. 
 177 See, e.g., Chicago Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 250 (1897) 
(measuring just compensation “by reference to the uses for which the property is suitable, 
having regard to the existing business and wants of the community, or such as may be 
reasonably expected in the immediate future”); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376 
(1943) (“On the other hand, if the taking has in fact benefited the remainder, the benefit 
may be set off against the value of the land taken.”); United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 
441 U.S. 506, 516–17 (1979) (refusing to pay replacement value for condemned land and 
instead relying on fair-market value). 
 178 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (upholding a corporation’s right 
to engage in political speech). 
 179 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565 (1995) (rejecting arguments extending 
the Commerce Clause to the statute at issue). 
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amendment procedures, litigation, executive orders or agency 
regulations, and judicial opinions.  
C.  FRAMERS AND REFRAMERS AS CONSTITUTIONAL COMMUNITIES 
As with constitutional common good resources, we can view the 
Framers through the lens of cultural public goods communities.  
Specifically, the historical communities that came together to pool 
knowledge and experience to draft the Constitution took part in 
what is perhaps one of the most important and celebrated 
intellectual endeavors of all time, at least in the governance 
context.  These communities came together to decide how best to 
allocate rights and rules of governance, to decide what 
constitutional public goods resources should be made available to 
the citizenry and which ones should not.  They had conflicts and 
the document was far from perfect—it included, for example, the 
continuance of slavery and denied the right to vote to many classes 
of people (e.g., women, non-whites, and non-land owners).180  While 
the Constitution and Bill of Rights were not perfect, they did 
provide a way for the document to change as progress would 
demand.  Enter the Reframers. 
Reframers are communities that arose later to mold and shape 
the Constitution through both direct textual changes in the form of 
constitutional amendments, as well as through constitutional 
interpretation by courts or constitutional action by legislatures or 
the Executive. Reframer communities have come together to 
provide new constitutional resources and new interpretations 
about the appropriation of existing constitutional resources or to 
ward off such changes.  Thus a variety of constitutional public 
goods have been created over time—freedom was given to slaves,181 
                                                                                                                   
 180 The continuance of slavery was made infamous through the so called “Three-Fifths 
compromise” found in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 cl. 3.  Although there was no specific 
constitutional prohibition denying the right to vote to women, non-whites, and non-land 
owners, it took specific constitutional amendments to grant voting rights to women and 
non-whites.  See id. amend. XIV, § 1 (granting all citizens the privileges of citizenship); id. 
amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude.”); id. amend. XIX (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.”). 
 181 Id. amend. XIII. 
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the right to vote was given to both minorities and women,182 and 
the original system of checks and balances remains for the most 
part untouched. 
Ultimately, Framers came together, and Reframers continue to 
come together, to resolve constitutional rights and governance 
conflicts.183  Constitutional communities seek to achieve collective 
action and coordination and to overcome transaction costs in order 
to create constitutional goods in an area of conflict.184  Identifying 
such areas of conflict is not particularly difficult in the natural 
resource context, since the common-pool nature of the resources 
gives rise to readily identifiable and well-recognized problems of 
overconsumption and tragic over-appropriation.185  In the same 
way, a variety of problems can be identified regarding the commons 
dimensions of the Constitution, because congressional, executive, 
judicial, and citizenry jockeying in a rivalrous manner over non-
excludable constitutional resources can potentially lead to erosion or 
instability of government, loss of checks and balances or 
government credibility, or governance gridlock and stagnation.186  
Yet the problems that constitutional communities seek to 
address are oftentimes more subtle than the glaring problems 
                                                                                                                   
 182 Id. amends. XV, XIX. 
 183 Madison et al. indicate that one should assess the goals or objectives constructed 
cultural commons communities maintain.  Madison et al., supra note 43, at 691. 
 184 As Madison et al. argued, 
[t]he various problems that cultural commons institutions solve are not 
merely, or even primarily, problems of overuse.  The problems addressed by 
cultural commons include the production of intellectual goods to be shared, 
the overcoming of transaction costs leading to bargaining breakdown 
among different actors interested in exploiting the intellectual resource, the 
production of commonly useful platforms for further creativity, and so 
forth. 
Id.  Indeed, Madison et al. note that “we can distinguish among different types of cultural 
commons based on their core purposes.  Some such commons arise as solutions to collective 
action, coordination, or transactions cost problems . . . .”  Id.  
 185 Madison et al. state:  
In the natural resource context, this question does not often come to the 
fore because common-pool resources are defined by the problem of 
subtractability or rivalrousness (e.g., removing lobsters from the pool 
results in fewer lobsters for everyone else) and the risk that a common-pool 
resource will be exhausted by uncoordinated self-interested activity (e.g., 
unmanaged harvesting may jeopardize the sustainability of the lobster 
population). 
Id. 
 186 See supra Part IV.D (describing these features of the tragedy of the constitutional 
commons).   
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potentially created by constitutional common good conflicts. 
Constitutional communities may simply feel that constitutional 
rights or rules of governance are misallocated, and so they come 
together to engage other constitutional communities in a common 
good battle over the allocation of those rights or rules of 
governance.  This may not give rise to governmental erosion, 
instability, or lack of credibility, but may rather serve the valuable 
purpose of allocating constitutional resources in a more fair and 
just way or in a way more in keeping with modern society.  
Perhaps more importantly, constitutional communities aim to 
go above and beyond the initial conflicts over the allocation of 
constitutional common good resources by maintaining and 
improving upon the public goods attributes of constitutional rights 
and rules of governance.  Constitutional communities pool 
collective knowledge to ensure that constitutional public goods 
remain available to the U.S. citizenry and that transaction costs 
are reduced for those seeking to access constitutional resources.  
They may even engage in efforts to create new constitutional 
rights or rules of governance not yet provided for by the 
Constitution.  This creation of public goods resources may very 
well involve jockeying over the common good dimensions of the 
Constitution,187 but there is no doubt that the creation and 
maintenance of public good constitutional resources is a primary 
objective of constitutional communities. 
D.  CHALLENGES RELATED TO PUBLIC GOOD CONSTITUTIONAL 
RESOURCES 
Just as common good resources may give rise to tragedies of 
over-appropriation of constitutional resources, resulting in 
governance instability, gridlock, erosion, and loss of credibility, so 
too do constitutional communities attempting to create public good 
rights and governance rules give rise to potential problems.  The 
primary way this plays out is that when a constitutional 
community proves successful, we risk the aggregation of too much 
power in the hands of one constitutional community relative to 
                                                                                                                   
 187 See supra Part IV.A (listing major Supreme Court cases involving such jockeying); 
infra Part VI.A.4 (noting that when a common good conflict is resolved, a public good 
constitutional resource is created). 
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another. In this way, the constitutional commons may not only 
give rise to overconsumption of the constitutional resource,188 but 
might also fail to adequately facilitate reframing efforts by other 
constitutional communities, whether it be the Executive, the 
Legislature, the Judiciary, other levels of government, or perhaps 
most likely, the citizenry.  Madison, Frischmann, and Strandburg 
argue that “[i]n the cultural environment, the tragedy of the 
commons that Hardin described may refer not to an undersupply 
of a resource prompted by overconsumption but instead to an 
undersupply prompted by the failure of the private market to 
aggregate user or consumer preferences for certain fundamental or 
‘infrastructural’ resources.”189  
In the constitutional commons there might be an undersupply 
of rights provisions prompted by the failure of constitutional 
communities (courts, the Executive, the Legislature, or citizens) to 
provide the resource.  For example, even in the presence of 
constitutional provisions providing civil rights in 1868,190 Supreme 
Court judicial interpretations mandating civil rights in 1954,191 
and acts of Congress doing the same in 1964,192 the Constitution 
standing alone continually failed to provide civil rights protections 
to certain segments of the citizenry, and particularly African 
Americans. One constitutional community—those who opposed 
civil rights protections for African Americans—had such a 
stranglehold on the resource, that reallocation of the resource and 
appropriation of it to other constitutional communities (African 
American communities and their supporters) became impossible 
for yet other constitutional communities (courts and Congress).  
Ultimately, a majoritarian white constitutional community caused 
an undersupply of the civil right resource to African Americans 
and did so by effectively ignoring the attempts to re-appropriate 
the resource by the courts and Congress. 
                                                                                                                   
 188 See supra Part IV (framing the Constitution as a common good and discussing, inter 
alia, the rivalrous nature of constitutional resources and the difficulty in excluding 
potential appropriators). 
 189 Madison et al., supra note 43, at 697. 
 190 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 191 See Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that “in the field of public 
education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place”). 
 192 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a–2000h (2012)).  
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As alluded to in this discussion, the primary reason that 
constitutional communities seeking to create public good rights 
and rules of governance can prove problematic is because the 
consequences of their actions reverberate through the common 
good dimensions of constitutional resources, where winning and 
losing often amounts to a zero-sum game.  In the next Part, we 
meld the discussion of common good and public good dimensions of 
constitutional resources to provide a more complete and complex 
picture of the Constitution.  
VI.  OUR CONSTITUTIONAL COMMONS AND THE CYCLE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL RESOURCE CREATION AND APPROPRIATION 
Constitutional resources are complex.  As discussed in Part IV, 
some dimensions of constitutional resources fit the mold of 
traditional common good resources, and the commons literature 
provides some important insights regarding these resources.  An 
important lesson of that analysis is that through efforts to create 
and modify constitutional resources, we often find a throng of 
rivalrous resource appropriators that have every incentive to 
appropriate as many constitutional resources as possible.  Under 
certain circumstances, these resources, like all common good 
resources, may tend toward the tragedy of the commons.  In this 
context, a tragedy of the commons can lead to diminishing 
institutions, the health of which is critical to maintaining the rule 
of law and governance continuity. 
Part V provided a very different picture of constitutional 
resources and the communities that attempt to create them.  
Using insights from the cultural public goods literature, Part V 
examined the collaborative work of constitutional communities in 
the advocacy for, and provision and maintenance of, constitutional 
resources.  Within that conversation, we discussed the ways in 
which constitutional communities emerge and sustain themselves 
as they work collaboratively to create and maintain these goods. 
In this Part, the Article weaves together insights from these 
literatures to provide a more holistic understanding of 
constitutional resources.  As demonstrated below, constitutional 
communities come together and engage in traditional common 
good rivalry with other constitutional communities in an attempt 
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to create public good constitutional resources.  In this way the 
traditional commons dimension of the Constitution is inextricably 
intertwined with the cultural public good dimension.  We call this 
multidimensional structure within which constitutional resources 
are embedded the “Constitutional Commons.” 
While our thinking on this more holistic picture of the 
Constitutional Commons is still quite preliminary, what emerges 
most clearly is how these different dimensions of the 
Constitutional Commons interact with one another to create a 
cyclical pattern of constitutional change and continuity. 
A.  THE THEORETICAL GROUNDING—OSTROM’S IAD FRAMEWORK 
Elinor Ostrom, in her book Understanding Institutional 
Diversity, observes that “whenever interdependent individuals are 
thought to be acting in an organized fashion, several layers of 
universal components create the structure that affects their 
behavior and the outcomes they achieve.”193  Ostrom provided 
what she termed an “Institutional Analysis and Development,” or, 
“IAD,”194 framework for analyzing these situations, as depicted in 
FIGURE 1, below.  IAD framework analysis focuses on a particular 
“action arena,” which itself consists of “participants” and “action 
situation[s]” that “interact as they are affected by exogenous 
variables . . . and produce outcomes that in turn affect the 
participants and the action situation.”195  As described in this 
section, Ostrom’s IAD theoretical framework quite precisely 
describes the cycle within which constitutional communities (as 
participants) engage in rivalrous action situations with other 
constitutional communities to produce outcomes that in turn affect 
each constitutional community’s future interactions on the 
constitutional commons.196  
                                                                                                                   
 193 ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 6 (2005). 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. at 13. 
 196 FIGURE 1 is an adapted version of Ostrom’s graphic.  See id. at 15. 
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The participants in an action arena may be clear enough—
individuals jockeying for access to resources, for example—while 
an action situation “refers to the social space where participants 
with diverse preferences interact, exchange goods and services, 
solve problems, dominate one another, or fight (among the many 
things that individuals do in action arenas).”197  Ostrom includes 
as exogenous variables the rules participants use to order 
relationships,198 the biophysical or material conditions that action 
arenas act upon, and the attributes of the community within which 
an action arena is placed.199  
After exogenous variables feed into the action arena, and also 
feed into the arena’s concomitant interactions between action 
situations and participants, “[e]valuative criteria” may be “used to 
judge the performance of the system by examining the patterns of 
interactions and outcomes.”200  These outcomes “feed back onto the 
participants and the situation and may transform both over time 
[and] may also slowly affect some of the exogenous variables.”201  
So, if these outcomes are positive, the feedback on the participants 
                                                                                                                   
 197 Id. at 14. 
 198 These rules may traditionally be considered regulations, instructions, precepts, or 
principles.  Id. at 16–17.  Ostrom uses the term rules in the regulation sense, explaining 
that they may be “thought of as the set of instructions for creating an action situation in a 
particular environment.”  Id. at 17. 
 199 Id. at 15. 
 200 Id. at 13. 
 201 Id. at 13–14. 
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may encourage them to pursue sustaining the status quo in an 
even more dedicated manner, while negative outcomes may cause 
participants to restructure the action arena or seek to change some 
of the exogenous variables.  
While some who study the workings of institutions may be 
concerned primarily with the action arena upon which the 
exogenous variables operate, others may be concerned with specific 
exogenous variables.  For example, “[e]nvironmentalists tend to 
focus on various ways that physical and biological systems interact 
and create opportunities or constraints on the situations human 
beings face.”202  
In order to provide some context for Ostrom’s framework, 
consider an environmental example, since much of the work that 
has employed the framework is environmental in nature.  We start 
with exogenous variables. Imagine the habitat of an endangered 
species—the biophysical/material condition at issue.  There might 
be many attributes of a community that could affect that habitat—
for example, whether the property is privately or rather 
government-owned.  Also, while there are certainly a large number 
of relevant rules at issue, the procedures for listing and the 
substantive protection of the species under the federal Endangered 
Species Act (ESA) would come into play.203  Turning to the action 
arena, we might find participants in the form of groups that either 
actively support or oppose listing the species under the ESA.  
These groups might interact in various action situations to either 
achieve species protection under the ESA or perhaps to have it 
thwarted.  If participants are successful in having the species 
listed through the actions taken, then this outcome may feed back 
into and reinforce the exogenous variables that led to that 
outcome, meaning that participants supporting the listing are 
likely to seek to maintain the rules related to procedures for listing 
and substantive protection of the species whose habitat is thus 
situated.  The species’ viability may improve over time.  In the 
same way, participants opposing listing might allow feedback from 
the negative outcome (species listing) to spur efforts to change the 
rules related to procedures for listing and substantive protection of 
                                                                                                                   
 202 Id. at 16. 
 203 See generally 16 U.S.C. § 1533(1) (2012) (specifying the procedure by which the 
Secretary of the Interior may list a species as endangered or threatened). 
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species whose habitat is situated in the same manner as that in 
question. Evaluative criteria might be used by either set of 
participants to examine these patterns of interactions and 
outcomes in order to assess if and how the rules related to the 
community and the biophysical conditions should be maintained or 
perhaps changed in order to better manage the endangered species 
resource.  
This straightforward example from the biophysical world (or 
from the world of traditional common goods) might be just the type 
of scenario Ostrom envisioned, providing an analysis of how 
groups of individuals achieve particular outcomes for resource 
management within the institution in which they operate, and 
how those outcomes result in feedback that influences future 
resource management.  But we also might slightly modify 
Ostrom’s IAD framework to get a more precise conception of the 
constitutional commons and the communities that operate upon it.  
Consider the modification as represented in FIGURE 2 below.  
Paraphrasing Ostrom, the participants on the constitutional 
commons are no doubt acting in an organized fashion to facilitate 
their chosen form of governance, and so we should be able to 
identify “universal components” that create the structure affecting 
the behavior and outcomes achieved by constitutional 
commoners.204  The action arena in our example is the space in 
which the conflict over constitutional resources takes place.  We 
might consider the participants in the action arena the 
constitutional communities that arise on either side of a 
constitutional conflict and that engage in action situations to affect 
an outcome, such as a particular provision of a constitutional right 
or the creation of a rule of governance.205  
  
                                                                                                                   
 204 OSTROM, supra note 193, at 6. 
 205 See id. at 15 for original figure. 
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B.  EXOGENOUS VARIABLES WITHIN THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMONS 
Affecting the participants and their interactions in the action 
arena are at least three exogenous variables: (1) the attributes of 
the constitutional community; (2) the rules that guide how 
constitutional communities interact within the action arena; and 
(3) the constitutional conditions that affect the constitutional 
community’s operation, which we can describe as the substantive 
constitutional rights or rules of governance that the community 
seeks to shape.206  Here, we describe each in turn.207   
1.  Attributes of Constitutional Communities.  At the outset, we 
note that in discussing constitutional communities, these 
communities take two forms that morph into one another 
depending on the task at hand.  When we think about 
communities in isolation from each other, as the IAD framework 
suggests we should when considering exogenous variables, the 
task at hand is the creation of public goods.  The rivalrous 
                                                                                                                   
 206 See id. (outlining these three factors). 
 207 Also, as we move into this discussion, we note at times it is difficult to talk about 
elements of the framework in isolation.  When the conversation needs to shift in order to 
facilitate understanding of the framework or the interrelationships of its different aspects 
(e.g., the connection between attributes of a community as an exogenous variable and 
communities engaged in action arenas), we try to be clear. 
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enterprise of these communities battling with other communities 
does not really take shape until we enter the framework’s action 
arena, at which point the common good attributes of these 
communities arise.   
The lack of rivalry in pursuing a joint enterprise is quite 
important.  Whereas we typically would expect a successful 
community to restrict its membership to avoid overconsumption of 
a common good resource, with a public good resource there is no 
need to worry about overconsumption (because public goods are 
not depleted).208  In other words, the rules by which constitutional 
communities operate are quite different from the rules utilized by 
communities surrounding traditional common good resources, 
which are designed to manage depletable resources and prevent 
tragic overconsumption.  Generally speaking, openness of such 
communities is considered a good thing both theoretically and 
practically for those trying to further the constitutional cause.209  
There is strength in numbers in creating public good resources, not 
weakness, because these are “naturally shareable without a risk of 
congestion or overconsumption.”210  The only real risk is if those 
within a constitutional community have different visions of what 
constitutional resource the community ought to be pursuing, 
because this could push the community into the constitutional 
action arena where we see constitutional conflicts splinter 
communities in a rivalrous world of winners and losers.  Yet in 
that circumstance, the worst we might see is two distinct 
constitutional communities arising out of the action arena—each 
individually maintaining an openness that allows others to join 
their respective cause in attempting to create public good 
constitutional resources. 
To be clear, there may be certain practical limitations on the 
ability of citizens, for example, to access and form constitutional 
communities.  Indeed, access to such communities “varies 
according to the costs of surmounting barriers (in terms of money, 
conditions, or other restrictions) to exploitation.”211  In other 
                                                                                                                   
 208 See supra note 20 and accompanying text (noting that while public goods are shared by 
many, they are not depletable). 
 209 Madison et al. indicate that one should assess the goals or objectives constructed 
cultural commons communities maintain.  Madison et al., supra note 43, at 691. 
 210 Id. at 694. 
 211 Id. at 695. 
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words, just because groups have an incentive to grow and to 
pursue the allocation of a constitutional resource, that incentive 
does not eliminate the reality that we live in a world characterized 
by transaction costs.212  For example, it very well may be the case 
that the limitations imposed upon those living in poverty and 
seeking to hire a lawyer to push a constitutional case are 
prohibitive.213  The same may be true for those seeking to 
overcome collective action problems to coordinate their 
constitutional preferences.  And yet, this is the very role of many 
constitutional communities—to overcome transaction costs 
associated with access to constitutional resources and pool 
knowledge and experience in a way that benefits underprivileged 
citizens.  These communities not only provide underprivileged 
citizens with access to the public goods constitutional resources 
themselves (i.e., the ability to exercise the right to vote), but also 
give them a voice in the common good rivalry that creates the 
public good resource in the first instance (i.e., the ability to bring a 
claim that the constitutional right to vote is being mismanaged in 
some way, such as in the case of modern voter fraud “regulation” 
controversies214). 
So without trying to ignore the significant practical barriers 
that might often stand in the way, it is quite remarkable how open 
the Constitution is as a matter of institutional design.  This begins 
with the First Amendment’s protections of speech, press, 
assembly, and religion.215  In many ways, the tools that the 
Constitution provides to reallocate rights, obligations, and 
governance authority are intended to be open to all citizens, 
branches of government, and levels of government.  Reframers 
participate in constitutional communities through a number of 
mediums that facilitate the “openness” of the constitutional 
commons. 
                                                                                                                   
 212 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960) (reasoning that 
transaction costs “present many transactions that would [otherwise] be carried out”).  
 213 See supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing access to the legal justice 
system for the poor). 
 214 See, e.g., Juan Williams, GOP’s Fictional Voter Fraud Charges Aim to Keep Democrats 
from Voting, FOX NEWS (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/08/03/gop-fiction 
al-voter-fraud-charges-aim-to-keeping-democrats-from-voting/ (arguing that there is a lack of 
documented voter fraud and that this invalidates the basis for photo ID laws). 
 215 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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This openness, of course, spills over into the world of common 
goods as well.  Citizens enter into, participate in, and contribute to 
constitutional communities in many ways, ranging from showing 
up at the voting booth and bringing citizen-suits to lobbying their 
elected officials and participating in public processes geared 
toward steering the directions of executive agency actions.  Of 
course, the very groups that work together in making public good 
constitutional resources that are available to all citizens must do 
so by initially, or repeatedly, entering the fray and using those 
tools to engage in common good conflicts with other constitutional 
communities seeking to reframe the text and interpretation of the 
Constitution.  
We see the same dynamics within government itself.  Members 
of Congress capitalize on the openness of constitutional 
communities by legislating with like-minded members of Congress.  
Members of the Judiciary come together on either the majority or 
minority side of cases involving constitutional questions.  
Constitutional communities consisting of executive agencies often 
take on the characteristics of the constitutional worldview of the 
Executive who appoints the agency heads, and these communities 
of course can be displaced by a different, and perhaps opposing, set 
of constitutional communities upon the arrival of the next 
President. 
2.  Rules Guiding Constitutional Communities.  Second in our 
exogenous variables category are the rules that guide how 
constitutional communities interact within the action arena.216  We 
can think of these as the constitutional procedures that must be 
followed by citizens, courts, legislatures, the Executive, and states 
in order to seek access to the constitutional commons and shape 
the resources it provides.  These rules might also implicate the 
overarching constitutional philosophy of a particular community.  
For example, these rules put into play questions like whether the 
U.S. Constitution is a “living document” that adjusts social 
ordering as society changes and new needs arise, as put forth by 
some constitutional communities,217 or whether it is instead 
                                                                                                                   
 216 OSTROM, supra note 193, at 16–17. 
 217 See, e.g., PETER IRONS, BRENNAN VS. REHNQUIST: THE BATTLE FOR THE CONSTITUTION 
38 (1994) (quoting Justice Brennan’s assertion that “the genius of the Constitution rests not 
in any static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the 
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beholden to an originalist understanding so as to preserve social 
ordering based upon the Framers’ conceptions of governance.218  Of 
course, constitutional communities are key to shaping this debate, 
coming together to pool their knowledge and resources and to 
access the Constitution in order to shape its continued 
construction as either living and malleable in the hands of new 
constitutional communities or static based upon the intent of the 
Framers and limited to subsequent Reframer textual 
amendments.  
Relatedly, what rules do constitutional communities use in an 
action arena to provide resources? Constitutional resources—the 
allocation of rights, rules of governance, and facilitation of stable 
social ordering—are provisioned through legal mechanisms, such 
as congressional statutes, executive orders and regulations, 
judicial interpretations, and citizen access to all three of those 
branches of government.  Each of these managers plays a role in 
defining resource boundaries and the provision of constitutional 
resources. 
We next ask, what rules govern who joins the community or 
who “participat[es] in decision making about how the resources 
will be produced and managed”?219  The governance mechanisms 
that the Constitution provides for participating in the creation and 
maintenance of constitutional resources are fairly robust, making 
accessible to virtually any citizen a right to engage in a 
constitutional community with inputs into the constitutional 
system.  The Constitution does establish rules regarding who may 
                                                                                                                   
adaptability of its great principles to cope with current problems and current needs”); 
Bernard Schwartz, “Brennan vs. Rehnquist”—Mirror Images in Constitutional Construction, 
19 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 213, 239 (1994) (“The outstanding feature of Justice Brennan’s 
‘living’ constitution is its plastic nature.”). 
 218 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF 
THE LAW 143 (1990) (arguing that “[o]nly [originalism] is consonant with the design of the 
American Republic”); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1–2 (1980) (defining 
interpretivism by reference to “its insistence that the work of the political branches is to be 
invalidated only in accord with an inference [that] is fairly discoverable in the 
Constitution”); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 10 
(1982) (“[T]he Court [often] reaches decision by interpreting—deciphering—the textual 
provision (or the aspect of governmental structure) that is the embodiment of the 
determinative value judgment.”); MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 22 (1988) (“According to the originalism theory, judges 
‘should confine themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implied in the 
written Constitution.’ ” (quoting ELY, supra, at 1)). 
 219 Madison et al., supra note 43, at 703. 
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participate in Congress, courts, and the Executive Branch 
(through age requirements, for example),220 how the Constitution 
may be amended,221 and when individuals can exercise rights to 
enter court or the voting booth222 to shape the constitutional 
commons.  Yet it also seeks to ensure that every citizen maintains 
the ability to access and shape the constitutional commons at some 
point in time if the prerequisites are met.  
3.  Constitutional Conditions.  The third, and perhaps most 
important, exogenous variable relates to the constitutional 
conditions that affect the constitutional community’s operation.  
The Constitution is an old document, and the conditions that serve 
as the backdrop to constitutional conflicts, such as the state of 
judicial precedents and constitutional amendments, change as 
history marches on.  Constitutional conditions at any one point in 
time describe the substantive constitutional rights or rules of 
governance existing at that time.  It is these conditions that 
constitutional communities seek to shape.  In thinking about what 
constitutes the relevant constitutional conditions, we might also 
frame this as a question—what is the current status of a 
constitutional right or rule of governance that a constitutional 
community is seeking to either perpetuate or to change?  
The reason constitutional conditions might be the most 
important exogenous variable is that they have quite a different 
effect on the action arena than do the biophysical/material 
conditions in Ostrom’s framework.  There are constraints within 
the biophysical/material world that limit to a degree how the 
commoners can interact within an action arena, the types of 
outcomes they can achieve, and how those outcomes provide 
feedback that influences their future management of the commons.  
For example, commoners within the global environment only have 
so much fossil fuel, so many minerals, so much natural capital and 
other resources to manage in an action arena—at least within a 
limited range that accounts for technological advances or other 
improvements in management that “extend” the life or 
                                                                                                                   
 220 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (setting age requirement at thirty-five for 
presidency); id. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (setting age requirement at twenty-five for the House of 
Representatives); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (setting age requirement for the Senate at thirty years). 
 221 Id. art. V. 
 222 See id. amend. XXVI (setting voting age at eighteen). 
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productivity of a biophysical resource. Take the example of the 
ESA presented earlier.223  The rules established for management 
of endangered species resources are necessarily constrained 
biophysically, a fact that sets in stone the impact that this 
particular exogenous variable will have on action arenas and 
outcomes which then feed back into the management process.  
Constitutional conditions are not so limited, much like other 
cultural public goods, such as IP regimes.  Constitutional 
resources, just like other intellectual pursuits, are unbounded and 
infinite, and thus the outcomes achieved by constitutional 
commoners are also never bounded.  This provides an important 
feedback incentive that keeps constitutional commoners both 
engaged in the management of resources and innovative in the 
creation of resources.  Contrast this with the world of natural 
resources, such as the options facing fossil fuel producers.  Those 
resources are bounded by the ultimate finiteness of fossil fuels, 
whereas the world of constitutional governance is only limited to 
the extent of constitutional commoners’ ability to divine new ways 
of structuring constitutional law.   
C.  ACTION ARENA 
As represented in FIGURE 2,224 each of these exogenous 
variables feed into the constitutional action arena as rival 
constitutional communities participate in action situations that we 
call constitutional conflicts, which again might arise over a 
particular provision of a constitutional right or the creation of a 
rule of governance.  The interactions and outcomes that arise out 
of the action arena can then be analyzed with evaluative criteria 
that tell us how well constitutional resources are being 
appropriated.  In other words, we must look to “[p]atterns and 
[o]utcomes [e]manating from a [p]articular [a]ction [a]rena” and 
“[s]olutions and [b]enefits,” and constitutional communities 
“should be assessed not only in light of [their] ostensible purposes 
but also in light of [their] consequences.”225  We may see effective 
and stable governance and a long-enduring commons institution, 
                                                                                                                   
 223 See supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
 224 See supra note 205. 
 225 Madison et al., supra note 43, at 704–05 (emphasis omitted). 
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or we may see evidence of the challenges posed by the tragedy of 
the commons, such as governance instability, erosion, and loss of 
credibility.226  We also might see challenges relating to public 
goods, such as a skewed balance of power.227  
Still, on the whole the Constitution proves to be fairly effective 
in allowing constitutional communities to create and maintain 
constitutional resources, establishing a stable interaction between 
constitutional communities (legislatures, courts, the Executive, 
and the citizenry) and common good resources (rights, rules of 
governance, and social ordering).  In other words, the Constitution 
is a relatively successfully managed commons supported by 
successful communities focused on shaping and maintaining public 
good constitutional resources through commons rivalry with other 
communities.  The Constitution produces an increasingly refined 
allocation of rights and presumably more stable social ordering, 
though there are certainly cases that some constitutional 
communities would argue have resulted in less stable social 
ordering through, for instance, an undermining of the democratic 
process (such as in the case of Citizens United).228  The outcomes 
that are achieved through constitutional conflicts between 
constitutional communities seeking to create public goods 
constitutional resources are particularly important since, as 
alluded to, the outcomes may feed back into and reinforce each 
constitutional community’s desire to maintain the resource as 
allocated or incentivize (or disincentivize) the losing party to 
continue to fight and engage in the action arena. 
D.  HOW THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMONS PLAYS OUT IN THE IAD 
FRAMEWORK 
Let us look once again to our earlier ESA example to see 
FIGURE 2 play out fully in the constitutional context, and outside 
of the pure biophysical context in which Ostrom’s initial 
framework operates. Consider parties challenging a specific 
application of the ESA as beyond the scope of authority granted to 
the federal government under the Commerce Clause, as may be 
                                                                                                                   
 226 See supra Part IV.D for a discussion of this phenomenon. 
 227 See supra notes 188–89 and accompanying text. 
 228 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (concluding that Congress cannot 
limit corporate independent expenditures). 
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the case with Chief Justice Roberts’s “hapless toad.”229  One group 
of constitutional communities may come together to pool 
knowledge and intellectual resources to have a certain species 
listing declared unconstitutional and beyond the federal 
government’s Commerce Clause authority, and may engage in an 
action arena with another group of constitutional communities 
seeking to uphold a species listing as constitutional.  The 
exogenous variables that feed into the action arena during this 
constitutional conflict are the constitutional conditions presented 
(a challenged exercise of federal power over endangered species), 
the attributes of each community seeking to engage in the action 
arena, and the rules (or constitutional procedures) utilized by each 
community as they engage with each other in the action arena.  
The action arena is itself the place where the common good 
dimensions of the Constitution play out, as two communities rival 
over the constitutional resource that is federal authority (or 
perhaps private landowner action free of federal interference) over 
endangered species.  A gain for one community is a direct loss for 
another.  
Yet once the case is resolved, say, in favor of the community 
seeking a declaration that federal authority in this particular 
application of the ESA is unconstitutional, then they succeed in 
shaping the constitutional landscape by providing and 
maintaining a public good constitutional resource—no similarly 
situated private property owners or state governments that avail 
themselves of the right to manage their property despite the 
presence of this species, free of federal government interference, 
inhibit other similarly situated entities from also doing so.  This is 
the public good dimension of the Constitution that arises once a 
constitutional conflict is resolved (at least for the time being).  This 
outcome, in turn, may feed back into both the action arena and the 
exogenous variables to motivate the constitutional community that 
won to continue to fight similar battles against claims of federal 
authority over endangered species, while the outcome may cause 
the losing constitutional community to regroup and change its 
                                                                                                                   
 229 See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Human Nature, the Laws of Nature, and the Nature of 
Environmental Law, 24 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 231, 231–33 (2005) (discussing controversy of and 
quoting from Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in Rancho Viejo v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J., dissenting)). 
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attributes, the rules it utilizes, or its interactions in the action 
arena (such as its litigation strategy) to have federal authority 
validated in similar circumstances in the future. 
E.  HISTORICAL IMPORT OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMONS CYCLE AND IAD FRAMEWORK 
As we know from constitutional history, at the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787 some—but not all—of the delegates wanted 
something more from the meetings than a mere revision of the 
Articles of Confederation.230  They wanted a Constitution that was 
more capable of unifying the fragmented jurisdictions and 
citizenry that made up the disaffected colonies.231  Even before the 
Convention began, and certainly during the Convention, different 
coalitions of delegates worked collaboratively to sustain the effort 
and shape the text that ultimately became our Constitution.232  It 
seems a textbook example of the collaborative communities 
examined in the cultural public goods literature.  What we see 
emerge then are framing coalitions, and it was these coalitions 
that were participants in the IAD action arena. 
The history of our Constitution also highlights that very few of 
the decisions made at the Constitutional Convention were easy.  In 
fact, much of the delegates’ time was spent trying to overcome 
what seemed at the time to be intractable conflicts.233  When we 
think about the give-and-take, the tireless negotiations, and the 
concessions made and won, our constitutional history is seen much 
more clearly through the lens of common goods.  Where we find 
debate, the driver of debate is, perhaps uniformly, the fact that the 
Constitution facilitates a rivalrous world of winners and losers.  At 
the Convention, sometimes disputes presented different stakes for 
                                                                                                                   
 230 See BEEMAN, supra note 84, at 88 (detailing Virginia Governor Edmund Randolph’s 
plan “to scrap the Articles altogether for a truly ‘national’ government”). 
 231 See id. at 129, 134 (discussing James Wilson’s concerns over the need for energy, unity, 
and direction for the new government, which a stronger Executive would establish). 
 232 See generally DAVID O. STEWART, THE SUMMER OF 1787: THE MEN WHO INVENTED THE 
CONSTITUTION (2007) (describing in detail the Convention and its participants); BEEMAN, 
supra note 84 (same). 
 233 See, e.g., BEEMAN, supra note 84, at 106–09 (noting the “explosive issues” involved in 
the construction of Congress and explaining that this “most important branch of the new 
government [became] a source of contention”). 
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2015 11:24 AM 
1062  GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:995 
 
big states versus small states.234  At other times, disputes arose 
between northern states and southern states jockeying for certain 
constitutional resources they believed would give them a 
governance advantage.235  And in even other instances, the 
deliberations are best understood as disputes surrounding the 
delegates’ preferences regarding the balance of power between 
state and federal governments, among the branches of the federal 
government, or even between state or federal governments and the 
citizenry.236  The divisiveness of the debates was so pronounced 
that the fact that the delegates ultimately arrived at a successful 
compromise has caused some to label the Convention the “Miracle 
at Philadelphia.”237  This clash of framing coalitions taking place 
in the action arena of the Constitutional Convention results in 
what may be termed “framing fights.” 
Similar stories could be told about the debates surrounding the 
ratification of the Constitution, the passage of the Bill of Rights, 
or, in fact, any of the other amendments to the Constitution.  We 
see time and time again communities coming together to advocate 
for various constitutional resources.  These efforts, regardless of 
the form they take, whether published as The Federalist238 or aired 
as political issue ads on television, present similar interactions: 
constitutional communities working collaboratively together 
attempting to create advocacy blocks (i.e., building framing 
coalitions) and then employing these blocks within conflicts 
surrounding the text of our Constitution (i.e., framing, or 
reframing, fights). 
Once we have text, the rights, power, and other resources 
created by constitutional text almost always take on public good 
attributes.  One person’s exercise of their Fifth Amendment right 
                                                                                                                   
 234 See id. at 55 (explaining that the larger states preferred proportional representation to 
equal representation since the former would favor those states’ larger populations). 
 235 See id. at 155 (noting the resistance of a Massachusetts delegate, Elbridge Gerry, to 
the “three-fifths compromise,” which was based on his belief that the Southern States 
should not be able to include slaves in the population for representation purposes since 
those states treated the slaves like property). 
 236 See, e.g., id. at 113 (summarizing Gerry’s continuing thoughts regarding concentrating 
power in a central government). 
 237 See CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787 ix (1966) (noting that James Madison 
and George Washington both used this phrase in describing the Convention). 
 238 See generally THE FEDERALIST (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1982). 
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to remain silent does not hamper that of another, nor does one’s 
exercise of freedom of speech diminish that of another, making 
these rights take on qualities of public goods resources.   
As any student of constitutional law understands, however, the 
meaning of constitutional text is often ambiguous, and this 
ambiguity becomes the basis for future conflicts as litigants, 
legislators, or branches of government compete in a rivalrous 
manner over constitutional resources.  Constitutional litigation 
attempting to clarify constitutional text, particularly within the 
Supreme Court and appellate courts to a lesser extent, often 
mirrors this cycle.  This cycle begins with coalitions attempting to 
prepare materials to advocate for one reading of the Constitution 
or another.  This initial building of reframing coalitions is best 
understood through the cultural public good lens, and its genesis 
really arises out of the exogenous variables that shape a 
constitutional community before it engages upon an action arena.  
These materials, however, are often eventually used in attempts to 
influence courts or the court of public opinion to understand the 
Constitution as having a particular meaning.  Whatever courts 
decide (even if they opt not to decide), they are in a world of 
rivalrous conflicts that produces winners and losers.  These are 
what we consider reframing fights.  Similar to the creation of 
constitutional text, the determination that the text has one 
meaning or another leads to the reallocation of constitutional 
resources.  And, these resources almost always take on public good 
attributes.   
Whether constitutional resources came through the Framers or 
through subsequent amendment or interpretation battles over 
constitutional text, this common good dimension of these resources 
lives on—and often drives constitutional communities to pool 
resources.  After all, the fact that the resource is non-rivalrous 
proves all the more frustrating to those dissatisfied, or even 
vehemently opposed, to the constitutional resource allocation in 
the first instance.  This frustration may cause some constitutional 
communities to emerge from the ashes of defeat and live on in 
preparation for the next battle—no matter how unlikely a 
reallocation of constitutional resources may be (consider 
communities who claim it is unconstitutional to require payment 
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of taxes).239  The provision of constitutional resources may cause 
even other constitutional communities to band together for the 
first time with the hopes of advocating for change.  And for those 
members of constitutional communities who consider themselves 
winners of constitutional resources, not only do they seek to 
maintain the public goods attributes of the resource allocated, but 
they are often inspired to carry on to defend the spoils they have 
gained and perhaps to organize in hopes of appropriating even 
more constitutional resources. 
So, the cycle of framing/reframing coalitions engaging in 
framing/reframing fights to affect constitutional resources lives on.  
The incentives at work provide a useful snapshot of our 
constitutional history and presumably of the trajectory of our 
constitutional future.  Even if one does not buy into the idea that 
the Constitution is a living document, ongoing efforts are needed 
to hold it in stasis.  So, regardless of the viewpoint constitutional 
communities embrace, Jefferson’s observation that “vigilance is 
the price of liberty” rings true just as much in the era of the 
Framers as it does today for the Reframers.240 
VII.  CONCLUSION  
Surprisingly, understanding how common good and public good 
dimensions of constitutional rights and rules of governance play 
out in the cycle provided by Ostrom’s IAD framework provides a 
powerful set of lenses through which to view constitutional law 
and politics.  The lessons of the traditional common good and 
public good literatures are vital to our understanding of the 
provision, redistribution, and maintenance of valuable 
constitutional resources—resources on which the very foundation 
of our democracy rests.  Within these literatures, we see tensions 
that have been with the United States since its founding.   
                                                                                                                   
 239 For instance, some groups have argued that paying taxes constitutes slavery.  
Lonsdale v. Egger, 525 F. Supp. 610, 612 (N.D. Tex. 1981); United States v. Roberts, 425 F. 
Supp. 1281, 1282 (D. Del. 1977); Beltran v. Cohen, 303 F. Supp. 889, 891 (N.D. Cal. 1969).  
For a more comprehensive discussion of this topic, see Christopher S. Jackson, The Inane 
Gospel of Tax Protest: Resist Rendering Unto Caesar—Whatever His Demands, 32 GONZ. L. 
REV. 291, 310 (1996–1997). 
 240 DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 386 (Bergen Evans ed., 1968). 
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On one hand, we see that it is through cooperation that 
reframing coalitions arise and are maintained.  For those who 
value constitutional protections, powers, rights, and other 
constitutional resources, Benjamin Franklin’s wisdom serves us 
well: “[w]e must indeed all hang together, or, most assuredly, we 
shall all hang separately.”241  While the force of his embedded pun 
has faded, it is this spirit that serves as a thread that has bound 
the United States together and sustained its Constitution for 
centuries. 
On the other hand, we see that what drives the communities 
together can often be self-interested and rooted in conflict as to the 
form that constitutional resources will take.  With this in mind, 
George Washington’s concern about factions, articulated in his 
celebrated Farewell Address,242 still resonate, perhaps now more 
than ever.   
The literature reveals an unyielding paradox embedded within 
the Republic: even as we find the threat that pits us against each 
other in some dimensions of the Constitutional Commons, we also 
find the thread that unyieldingly tugs at our constitutional fabric 
and binds our democracy together.  
                                                                                                                   
 241 Benjamin Franklin, Remark to John Hancock, at the Signing of the Declaration of 
Independence, 4 July 1776, in THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 102, 102 
(2d ed. 1981). 
 242  George Washington, Farewell Address, in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND 
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789–1902, at 218–20 (James D. Richardson ed., 1904).  For 
example, Washington warned against the “spirit” of party that  
is inseparable from our nature, having its root in the strongest passions of 
the human mind.  It exists under different shapes in all governments, more 
or less stifled, controlled, or repressed; but in those of the popular form it is 
seen in its greatest rankness and is truly their worst enemy. 
Id. at 218; see also Washington’s Farewell Address 1796, THE AVALON PROJECT, YALE LAW 
SCHOOL LILLIAN GOLDMAN LAW LIBRARY, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing. 
asp (last visited Apr. 6, 2015). 
